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A DEBATE CONTINUES on whether anticipatory self,defense is permitted in the era of the UN Charter.! Two recent commentators say 
that States need not await the first blow but may react in self,defense,2 provided 
principles of necessity and proportionality are observed. They differ, however, on 
when States may claim anticipatory self,defense.3 This is not surprising, since 
others seem to change views.4 Still others take no clear position.5 
Most anticipatory self,defense claims since World War II have been asserted 
by States responding unilaterally to another country's actions. Claims of this 
nature are more likely to be raised in the future.6 The UN Charter, Article 51, 
declares in part that "Nothing in the ... Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self,defence if an armed attack occurs against a [UN] 
Member ... until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security." This article proposes to analyze the alternative 
to individual self,defense, i.e, collective security pursuant to treaty. 
After examining nineteenth century international agreements and those of the 
first half of this century, the scope of collective self,defense in Charter, era treaties 
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will be analyzed. The inquiry for these agreements is whether a right of 
anticipatory collective self,defense is stated in them, paralleling States' right to 
claim individual anticipatory self,defense. If there is a right of anticipatory 
collective self,defense, what is the scope of that right, and what are the 
limitations on it? 
If the Peace of Westphalia (1648)7 began the nation,state system, the 
Congress of Vienna (1815)8 started the modem movement toward collective 
security.9 It is from this benchmark that Part I examines treaty systems through 
World War I. Part II analyzes treaty systems during the era of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations (1920-46),10 and the Pact of Paris (1928)11 through 
World War II. Part III examines the drafting of the Charter and court 
decisions, including the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, 
immediately following World War II. Part IV examines collective self,defense 
treaties concluded since 1945. Part V offers projections for the future of 
anticipatory collective self,defense in the Charter era. 
In terms of treaties and practice affecting the United States, between the 
alliance with France12 that helped support a successful Revolution and the 
Declaration of Panama,13 the United States did not ratify a single mutual 
self,defense agreement. The worldscale record has been different, but lack of 
U.S. participation in this kind of arrangement may explain why many in the 
United States are not familiar with the concept of collective self,defense, and 
particularly anticipatory collective self,defense. Because there has been a 
concept of anticipatory collective self,defense for nearly two centuries, 
including the 50 years that the Charter has been in force, this form of joint 
response by States appears to have attained the status of a customary norm. 
I. From the Congress of Vienna to World War I 
Within months after an ad hoc alliance14 defeated Napoleon I at Waterloo 
and established the Congress system,15 the principal powers began building 
alliances to assure peace. Austria, Prussia, and Russia pledged in the Holy 
Alliance (September 1815): 
Conformably to ... Holy Scriptures, which command all men to consider 
each other as brethren, the Three contracting Monarchs will remain united 
by ... a true and indissoluble fraternity, and considering each other as fellow 
countrymen, they will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and 
assistance; and, regarding themselves toward their subjects and armies as fathers 
of families, they will lead them, in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are 
animated, to protect Religion, Peace, and Justice. 16 
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Although at least six European states acceded to the Alliance, Great Britain's 
Prince Regent did not;17 the result was a Treaty of Alliance and Friendship in 
November 1815 to continue the earlier alliance's collective security policyY 
Besides confirming standing forces in France, the allies agreed to "concert 
together, without loss of time, as to the additional ... troops to be furnished ... 
for the support of the common cause; and they engage to employ, in case of 
need, the whole of their forces ... to bring the War to a speedy and successful 
termination, reserving to thems€lves to prescribe, by common consent, such 
conditions of Peace as shall hold out to Europe a sufficient guarantee against 
the recurrence of a similar calamity[,]" i.e., advent of another conquest. They 
also agreed to meet periodically to "consult ... upon their common interests, 
and for the consideration of the measures which at each of those periods shall 
be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations, and 
for the maintenance of the Peace ofEurope.,,19 
The Alliance, to which France was admitted as part of the Concert of 
Europe in 1818,20 had two policies: periodic consultation to consider measures 
to help preserve peace, and commitment of forces to end any conflict that had 
ignited. The Alliance thus bespoke the collective self,defense concept and, 
depending on the nature of consultations and actions decided, a potential for 
anticipatory self,defenseY An example of the latter occurred in 1848, when 
revolution in France accompanied transition to the Second Republic. Fearing a 
new war of French national liberation, Prussia put its Rhine troops on alert and 
Russia directed its armies to be ready for war. Tsar Nicholas was dissuaded from 
sending 30,000 to help Prussia, a move that might have resulted in war.22 
It was in this context that the right of anticipatory self,defense was formulated 
in the Caroline Case (1842), i.e., that a proportional anticipatory response in 
self,defense is admissible when the need is necessary, instant, overwhelming and 
admitting of no other alternative with no moment for deliberation.23 The final 
requirement-no moment for deliberation-is not inconsistent with 
consultation clauses in the early treaties. States then and now may consult and 
decide to employ anticipatory collective self, defense as an option to a threat. 
Moreover, States then and now might agree that those countries claiming a right 
of anticipatory self,defense might thus respond as part of collective self,defense. 
The Crimean War. 'The potential for reactive and anticipatory collective 
self,defense was stated again during the Crimean War (1854).24 The war began 
when Russia occupied the Turkish principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia; 
Britain and France declared they 
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... [had] concerted, and will concert together, as to the most proper means for 
liberating the Territory of the Sultan from Foreign Invasion, and for 
accomplishing the object ... [of reestablishing peace between Russia and Turkey 
and preserving the continent from "lamentable complications which . . . so 
unhappily disturbed the general Peace"] .... [T]hey engage to maintain, 
according to the requirements of the War, to be judged of by common 
agreement, sufficient Naval and Military Forces to meet those requirements, the 
description, number, and destination whereof shall, if occasion should arise, be 
determined by subsequent Arrangements. 
They renounced "Acquisition of any Advantage for themselves" and invited 
other European powers to accede to the alliance.25 Austria and Prussia tried to 
avoid participation in the war "and the dangers arising therefrom to the Peace 
of Europe"; they concluded a Treaty of Alliance, which, inter alia, said that "a 
mutual Offensive Advance is stipulated for only in the event of the 
incorporation of the Principalities, or ... attack on or passage of the Balkans by 
Russia.,,26 Later that year an alliance among Austria, Britain, and France 
attempted to protect Austria's occupation of the principalities against return of 
Russian forces. If war broke out between Austria and Russia, the three 
countries pledged their "Offensive and Defensive Alliance in the present \X'ar, 
and will for that purpose employ, according to the requirements of the \X'ar, 
Military and Naval Forces ... .'>27 Similar terms appeared in an 1855 allied 
convention with Sardinia.28 In 1855 Britain and France also pledged to "furnish 
... Sweden ... sufficient Naval and Military Forces to Co,operate with the 
Naval and Military Forces of [Sweden to] ... resist ... Pretensions or 
Aggressions of Russia.,,29 A treaty ring around Russia thus tightened. 
Preparations for the Crimea expedition, noted in the Anglo,French treaty, 
were in the nature of anticipatory self,defense, and the Austro-Prussian 
alliance recognized a concept of "Offensive Advance," i.e., anticipatory action, 
if Russia moved through the Balkans; the parties would attack Russia only if 
Russia passed through territory close to Austrian borders. Similar concepts 
were recognized in the Austro,Anglo-French alliance and the Sardinia military 
convention. The Swedish treaty also provided for anticipation of Russian 
action.3D 
A verbal agreement between France and Sardinia preceded the 
Franco,Austrian war (1858-59). It included a "defensive and offensive 
alliance," a French pledge to come to the aid of Sardinia ifit or Austria declared 
war, and a statement that occupation ofItalian territory, Austrian violation of 
existing treaties, "and other things of a similar kind" would cause a French war 
declaration.3! During the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), the belligerents 
368 
George K. Walker 
agreed to cooperate with Britain to assure Belgian neutrality if it were 
threatened by an opponent.32 In both cases, the potential for action was great 
and could have included what would be considered anticipatory self,defense 
today. An example from the 1858,59 conflict was Napoleon Ill's hearing 
reports that Prussia was mobilizing six army corps "inclined him further to 
make peace ... ."33 The Franco,Sardinian understanding was also an example 
of an informal self,defense arrangement, made without benefit of a formal 
treaty. A similar instance carne in the u.s. Civil War, when a Russian admiral 
confidentially advised U.S. Admiral David G. Farragut in 1863 that he had 
sealed orders to support the United States if it became involved in conflict with 
a foreign power (e.g., Britain or France) which supported the Confederacy, a 
war that never was.34 This form of informal collective self,defense is available 
under the UN Charter, as will be seen.35 
In Latin America there was a counterpart conflict, the War of the Triple 
Alliance (1865-70); Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay signed an "offensive and 
defensive" alliance, claiming Paraguay had provoked war. At the same time, 
however, other Latin American countries signed defense alliances pledging 
consultation and mutual defense against an aggressor or any acts to deprive 
them of sovereignty and independence.36 Western Hemisphere States, but not 
the United States, were thus negotiating the same kinds of treaties as in 
Europe. 
The Treaty Map Up to World War I, 1871,1914. After the Franco,Prussian War 
ended,37 agreements leading to the Triple Alliance (Austria,Hungary, Germany, 
Italy), and those resulting in the Entente of France and Russia and ultimately 
Great Britain, had examples of reactive or anticipatory self,defense. The 1907 
Hague Conventions, still in force, would impose rules for war declarations38 and 
forbid resort to war to collect contract debts,39 but do not apply to the collective 
self,defense issue. The alliance systems continued to provide for collective 
self,defense and sometimes explicitly recognized anticipatory self,defense, e.g., 
resort to self,defense if an opponent mobilized. Taylor makes the point that these 
treaties, along with economic development on the Continent, gave Europe 34 
years of peace.40 Cannot the same be said about alliance systems41 and regional 
economic development treaties42 since World War II? 
The Convention of Schonbrunn (1873) provided: if an "aggression corning 
from a third Power should threaten to compromise the peace of Europe, [the 
parties] mutually engage to corne to a preliminary understanding ... to agree as 
to the line of conduct to be followed in common." A special convention would 
be necessary to undertake military actionY In 1878 Britain concluded a 
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Defensive Alliance with Turkey aimed at Russian territorial interests in 
Turkey, promising to join Turkey to defend with force of arms.44 In 1879 
Austria,Hungary and Germany negotiated a Treaty of Alliance aimed at 
Russia. If Russia attacked either party alone or "by an active co,operation or by 
military measures which constitute a menace to the Party attacked," the other 
had to assist "with the whole war strength of their Empire[.],,45 It was "the first 
permanent arrangement in peace, time between two Great Powers since the 
end ofthe ancien regime. ,,46 Two years later, the three empires were on the same 
side, pledging that if one party were at war with a fourth Great Power, the 
others would maintain "benevolent neutrality.,,47 At about the same time Chile 
fought Bolivia and Peru in the Pacific War, which resulted in loss of Bolivia's 
coast and Peruvian territory; the defensive alliance between the two States 
pledged defense against "all foreign aggression" or acts designed to deprive a 
party of sovereignty and independence.48 
Treaties to isolate France began with the Treaty of the Triple Alliance 
(Austria,Hungary, Germany, Italy, 1882), "one of the most stable and 
important of the European alignments," lasting until 1915.49 If France attacked 
Italy, France attacked Germany, or if one or two signatories were attacked 
"without provocation," and were at war with two or more other Powers, the 
other had to join the conflict. 50 Articles 4 and 5 provided: 
[If] a Great Power nonsignatory to the ... Treaty should threaten the security 
of the states of one ... Part[y], and the threatened Party should find itself forced 
on that account to make war against it, the two others bind themselves to 
observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each ... reserves to itself, in 
this case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see fit, to make common 
cause with its Ally . 
. . . If the peace of any ... Part[y] should chance to be threatened under the 
circumstances foreseen by ... Articles [1-4], the ... Parties shall take counsel 
together in ample time as to the military measures to be taken with a view to 
eventual co-operation. 
Secrecy was p1edged;51 this was among many "secret" treaties of the era,52 
which were not truly secret, being so only for specific terms. In their "secrecy" 
they were "engines of publicity.,,53 
In 1883, Romania and Austria-Hungary agreed that if the other were 
attacked "without provocation," an obligation would arise. If either were 
"threatened by an aggression under [these] ... conditions," the governments 
would confer, with a military convention to govern operations.54 Germany 
acceded to this treaty, as did Ita1y.55 
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The third Triple Alliance56 resulted in the beginning of the Entente Cordiale, 
whose exchange of notes stated a Franco,Russian agreement that if "peace 
should be actually in danger, and especially if ... [a] part[y] should be threatened 
with an aggression, the two parties undertake to reach an understanding on 
mea;ures whose immediate and simultaneous adoption would be imposed upon 
the two Governments by the realization of this eventuality.,,57 A Military 
Convention followed in 1892, providing that if Triple Alliance forces or an 
Alliance State should mobilize, France and Russia, "at the first news of the event 
and without the necessity of any previous concert, shall mobilize immediately 
and simultaneously the whole of their forces and shall move them ... to their 
frontiers" to attempt to force a two,front war. Respective general staffs would 
cooperate to prepare and facilitate execution of these measures.58 These terms 
were generally not known, but most diplomats considered France and Russia 
partners.59 Britain joined the Entente by separate arrangement with France 
(1904)60 and Russia (1907)61 but signed no formal defense alliances, although 
Russia wanted them.62 Britain began unofficial military and naval conversations 
with France in 1906, however.63 
A 1904 Bulgar,Serb alliance "promise[d] to oppose, with all the power and 
resources at their command, any hostile act or ... occupation" of four Balkan 
provinces; it was directed at Turkey. The alliance also pledged joint defense 
"against any encroachment from any source . . . on the present territorial 
unity .... " If either event happened, the allies would conclude a special military 
convention.64 These countries negotiated the same arrangement in 1912, with 
a military convention.65 Bulgaria also negotiated an alliance with Greece; it 
provided that if either "should be attacked by Turkey, either on its territory or 
through systematic disregard of its rights, based on treaties or on the 
fundamental principles of international law," they would agree to assist each 
other.66 In 1913 Greece and Serbia signed an alliance and military convention; 
if "one of the two ... should be attacked without any provocation on its part," 
the other would assist with all of its armed forces.67 
In 1911, despite reticence to commit in Europe,68 Britain concluded a 
defensive alliance with Japan; the treaty had the almost standard articles for 
prior consultation, armed common defense upon unprovoked attack or 
aggressive action by a third State, with a military and naval arrangement to 
follow, and periodic military consultations.69 
Analysis. This labyrinth of agreements did not prevent, and may have 
contributed to,70 the Great War. Neither the Hague ultimatum system,?1 nor 
the language of these treaties, which pledged reactive self,defense but 
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occasionally contain a potential for anticipatory self,defense, could stop 
mobilizations and war declarations.72 It was applying military force and 
diplomacy, or failure to apply force and diplomacy properly through treaties,73 
and not provision for self,defense in them, which resulted in the cataclysm. 
The treaties of 1815-1914 were not drafted with today's concepts of 
self,defense, anticipatory self,defense, or collective self,defense in mind. They 
have been superseded by the Pact of Paris insofar as they justify resort to 
offensive war as national policy,74 and by the Covenant and the Charter as to 
their secrecy provisions.75 They were conditioned by the 1907 Hague 
Conventions.76 Nevertheless, several principles emerge. There was a concept 
of collective self,defense, multilateral and bilateral. Many treaties had general 
statements requiring prior consultation.77 Although most spoke of reactive 
self,defense, i.e., awaiting a first attack before responding, consistent with 
today's restrictive view, some contemplated anticipatory response.78 
This is particularly true for the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, where the 
victors established the Congress system with a multilateral defense treaty 
incorporating consultation and anticipatory self,defense principles.79 The 
Crimean War illustrates response to a regional conflict. States opposing Russia 
agreed on terms among themselves for prior consultation and to try to contain 
the conflict by warning Russia, at least on paper, of consequences of widening 
the war. Peripheral treaties, e.g., that with Sweden, were anticipatory in 
nature, warning Russia of consequences of wider action.80 In a very rough 
sense, between the Congress and the Crimea systems, we have the forerunner 
of the treaty system in place since World War II-an overarching instrument 
like the Charter,8l regional multilaterals like the North Atlantic Treaty,82 and 
bilaterals83 elsewhere around the world. 
Like Charter,era commentators,84 the record for anticipatory self,defense in 
the pre,World War I treaties is mixed. Unlike commentators who can only 
argue a position, treaty drafters who included anticipatory self,defense 
provisions laid groundwork for State practice85 in that they could be involved 
as a source of law86 if those treaties were carried out. If other agreements were 
fulfilled through anticipatory self,defense, a view that anticipatory self,defense 
was a feature of international law before 1914 was strengthened. 
ll. The Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris 
The League of Nations Covenant and the 1928 Pact of Paris, also known as 
the Kellogg, Briand Pact, were the principal governing instruments during the 
interwar years, 1920-39. These treaties, including the self,defense reservation 
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to the Pact of Paris and other agreements negotiated before World War II, and 
the views of commentators, demonstrate that anticipatory collective 
self,defense remained as a legitimate response under international law. 
The Covenant of the League of Nations. The Covenant of the League of 
Nations, a part of the World War I peace treaties,87 was treaty law by territorial 
application88 to League Members'89 colonies and dependencies for much of the 
Earth from 1920 through 1945. Major exceptions were: Germany, a member 
from 1926-35; Japan, a member from 1920-35; the USSR, a member from 
1934-39; and the United States, which was never a member. 
The Covenant's relatively weak principles for regulating use of force did not 
address self,defense issues directly. Its preamble declared that parties to the 
Covenant, "to achieve international peace and security ... accept[ed] .. . 
obligations not to resort to war ... [and] Agree[d] to [the] Covenant ... " 
Covenant Article 10 provided: " ... Members ... undertake to respect and 
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing 
political independence of all Members .... In case of any such aggression or in 
case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon 
the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled." (The Council included 
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers from World War I-France, Great 
Britain, Italy, and Japan-and four more League Members.)9o Article 11 
provided for League action in case of war or threat of war: 
1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any ... Members ... 
or not, is ... declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and [it] shall take 
any action ... deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. [If] any 
such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any 
Member ... forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. 
2. It is also ... the friendly right of each Member ... to bring to the attention of 
the Assembly or ... Council any circumstance whatever affecting international 
relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good 
understanding between nations upon which peace depends. 
The Assembly included representatives of all Members; the Secretary,General 
had functions similar to the UN Secretary,General.91 Members also agreed to 
resolve disputes by arbitration, judicial settlement or resolution by the Council 
or the Assembly.92 If a Member resorted to war, disregarding these covenants, it 
was "ipso facto ... deemed to have committed an act of war against all other 
Members ... ," which would undertake economic and other sanctions, leaving 
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military options to Council recommendations.93 The offending Member could 
not invoke treaties it did not register with the League, and the Assembly was 
charged with examining registered agreements for risks to peace.94 The 
Covenant was silent on options if the Council did not recommend action, or if 
it did and Members did not comply. 
The similarity of Covenant Articles 10-11 to Articles 1(1) and 2(4) ofthe 
UN Charter regarding threats to the peace or threats against any State might 
be noted: 
Article 1 
The Purposes of the United Nations are: 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the 
peace .... 
Article 2 
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes ... in Article 1, 
shall act in accordance with the following Principles: ... 
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.95 
Besides providing for external aggression against Members' territorial integrity, 
Covenant Article 10 also referred to "threat or danger of such aggression." 
Article 11 (1) declared of "war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting" 
a Member as League concern, and the League could take "any action" deemed 
wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." Article 11 (2) allowed a 
Member to bring forward "any circumstance whatever affecting international 
relations which threatens to disturb international peace .... " 
The Covenant drafters thus had in mind more than war declarations or 
outbreak of war. Like the Charter a quarter century later, the Covenant 
contemplated action against threats or dangers of aggression, or threats of war, 
or "any circumstance whatever ... threatening to disturb international peace." 
Article 16(1) declared that a Member's resort to war in violation of certain 
Covenant obligations would automatically result in that Member's action 
being "deemed ... an act of war against all other Members .... " Under treaty 
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interpretation canons,96 the Covenant, weak as it was in terms of enforcement, 
contemplated collective action to counter hostile intent and hostile action. 
Although the Covenant did not mention individual or collective 
self~defense, other Treaty of Versailles provisions declared that Germany was 
forbidden to maintain or fortify certain parts of the banks of the Rhine. 
Maintaining armed forces, whether permanently or temporarily stationed 
there, or permanent mobilization works, was forbidden. If Germany violated 
these provisions, she would "be regarded as committing a hostile act against the 
Powers signatory [to] the ... Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of 
the world."97 This was a statement of a potential for anticipatory collective 
self~defense. Unratified bilateral agreements between France and the United 
States, and France and Great Britain ancillary to the Treaty, confirm this view. 
These would have provided for Great Britain's and the United States' coming 
immediately to the aid of France if Germany committed "any unprovoked 
movement of aggression against her[.]" Because these agreements were 
effective only if Britain and the United States ratified respective bilaterals with 
France,98 U.S. failure to ratify the Treatr9 torpedoed the bilaterals, including 
the France~ UK agreement that was otherwise in force, as well. loo Nevertheless, 
use of "movement" in these treaties, and the Versailles Treaty language, shows 
that the treaty drafters considered anticipatory collective self~defense action as 
an option. Available evidence of the secret military convention between 
France and Poland (1921) could lead to a conclusion that it, too, contemplated 
anticipatory self~defense, as did the France~Czechoslovakia alliance (1924).101 
On the other hand, eastern European States' alliances creating the Little 
Entente provided for reactive self~defense.l02 
In 1931 League Assembly reports (one of them adopted by the Assembly) 
confirmed that legitimate self~defense was not excluded in the Covenant 
prohibition on recourse to war. l03 Principal League Members were unable to 
accept a proposed Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, open to all States, where any 
party attacked would receive immediate, effective assistance from other parties 
in the same part of the world, or the Protocol of Geneva, which would have 
branded any State choosing war over arbitration of a dispute as the aggressor, 
unless the Council decided otherwise.104 The right of self~defense became more 
explicit in reservations to the Pact of Paris and authoritative interpretation of 
the Pact. lOS 
Locamo, the Pact of Paris, and the Budapest Articles; Other Treaties. In 1925 
five powers-Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy-signed the 
Locarno Treaties. Belgium and Germany, and France and Germany, pledged 
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that they would not attack, invade, or resort to war against each other. This 
core Treaty of Mutual Guarantee stated exceptions for these undertakings: 
"legitimate defense" and the parties' action to settle a conflict or stop an 
aggressor if the League did not. Legitimate defense was defined as "resistance to 
a violation of the undertaking" not to attack or invade, or resistance to flagrant 
breach of the Versailles Treaty's demilitarization provisions, "if such breach 
constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of 
armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary."lC6 The 
Locarno treaties also created a system in the nature of collective self,defense.107 
The parties pledged to "collectively and severally guarantee ... maintenance of 
the territorial status quo [of] ... frontiers between Germany and Belgium and 
between Germany and France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fLxed 
by" the Versailles Treaty.10B The parties agreed to come immediately to the 
assistance of the target State.109 To the extent that the Locarno parties agreed 
to act collectively for flagrant breaches of the Versailles Treaty, Locarno could 
be said to restate anticipatory collective self,defense, in that failure to maintain 
a demilitarized area or status could be a hostile threat to other states. Only five 
countries were formal parties, but when their colonial empires and associated 
states are considered, Locarno's territorial scope was quite great. l1O 
Parties to the Pact of Paris (1928) renounced war as an instrument of 
national policy, agreeing to settle disputes by pacific means.1l1 The Pact is still 
in force, partly superseded by the Charter,112 with 69 parties by 1997.113 Treaty 
succession principles may apply it to more statesY4 The Pact's principles 
became part of the Nuremberg Charterl15 and Judgment, 116 they were affirmed 
as customary law by unanimous UN General Assembly Resolution 95(1).117 
Although the Pact did not address self,defense, an understanding promoted 
by the United States , 118 to which 14 major signatories including the colonial 
powers119 agreed,120 said the treaty did not affect the "inalienable" right of 
self,defense. The exchanged notes were "an authentic and binding 
commentary on and interpretation of the ... Treaty."121 There was no specific 
reference to anticipatory self,defense or collective self,defense in the 
diplomatic correspondence, but Great Britain broadly claimed: 
... [T]here are certain regions ... the welfare and integrity of which constitute 
a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government 
have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions 
cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the ... Empire a measure 
of self-defense. It must be clearly understood that ... Britain accept[sl the new 
treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of 
action in this respect. 12l 
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Britain referred to parts of its Empire, probably Egypt and the Persian Gulf, and 
perhaps other areas.123 A few States objected to the UK note, the USSR stating 
that "the result would be that there would probably be no place left ... where 
the Pact could be applied."124 Since the Commonwealth system included 
colonies, self,governing Dominions, India, and the Irish Free State , 125 the note 
may have reserved a right of self,defense for Britain to defend units of the 
Commonwealth and the Empire. Covenant provisions allowing League 
membership for colonies and Dominions126 underscored a potential for 
collective self,defense based on these relationships. 
The U.S. note, to which states had responded in general agreement, spoke 
of the "inherent" and "inalienable" right of self,defense.127 That this continued 
the prior law, which included rights of anticipatory self,defense and collective 
self,defense, was apparent from treaties, State practice and judicial decisions 
between 1928 and World War II. 
The Little Entente of Balkan states, following bilateral self,defense treaties 
in 1921,128 negotiated its Pact of Organization in 1930, declaring its governing 
Council's common policy would be inspired by, inter alia, the Covenant, the 
Pact of Paris, and the Locarno Treaties; the 1921 treaties were renewed 
indefinitelyY9 Since the Pact incorporated the Pact of Paris with its widely 
accepted self,defense reservation,130 the presumption is that the Entente 
accepted the concept in its self,defense considerations. That the Entente may 
have contemplated anticipatory self,defense among its response options is 
further evidenced by its agreement with other area countries, which pledged 
reaction to "aggression,,,l3l otherwise not defined, since the original 1921 
agreements pledged joint reaction to "unprovoked attack."m Whether 
aggression meant more, e.g., action short of attack, is not clear. However, 
citing the Pact of Paris indicates the Entente accepted anticipatory self,defense 
as a response option if it was part of that inherent right. 
Although not forming an organization specifically for the purpose-the Pan 
American Union133 was in place at the time-Western Hemisphere States, 
including the United States, negotiated agreements in 1936 to "supplement 
and reinforce" League efforts in seeking to prevent war. 134 These governments, 
besides reaffirming prior treaty obligations to settle international controversies 
between them by pacific means, also agreed to consult if there was a threat of 
war among them, subject to Member obligations under the Covenant. The 
Pact of Paris was among treaties whose obligations were confirmed.135 While 
these treaties-still in force136--do not cover a Hemisphere country's war with 
a State outside the Americas, in reaffirming the Pact of Paris and its 
self,defense reservation,137 they reinforce that law. 
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The 1937 Nyon Arrangement and the Agreement supplementing it138 
declared parties would defend merchant shipping and civil aircraft of any State 
attacked by surface ships, aircraft, or submarines in parts of the Mediterranean 
Sea.139 The Arrangement, besides announcing that a submarine attacking 
vessels contrary to the 1930 London naval armaments treaty and its 1936 
ProtocoP40 would be attacked and if possible destroyed, also said parties' forces 
would attack "any submarine encountered in the vicinity of a position where a 
ship not belonging to either ... conflicting Spanish parties [in the Spanish civil 
war] hard] recently been attacked in violation of the rules ... in circumstances 
which give valid grounds for the belief that the submarine was guilty of the 
attack." 141 Because of further submarine attacks on merchantmen, Nyon 
parties announced they would sink "any submarine found submerged" in 
Mediterranean Sea zones under their control.142 
The Arrangement as published and applied is an example of maritime 
anticipatory collective self~defense.143 Nine states-several with no 
Mediterranean coastlines-agreed to protect shipping and aircraft, including 
their own. These states declared they would attack a submerged submarine 
near an attacked merchantman and later broadened Arrangement coverage to 
include submarines found submerged in their patrol areas. (Today it would be 
said that a submarine's being in the area is a manifestation of hostile intent, and 
the submarine is subject to destruction in anticipation of its potential for 
attacking merchant shipping in the future.) When Mediterranean maritime 
states cooperated under the Arrangement to suppress submarine attacks, they 
acted in anticipatory collective self~defense. 
In 1934 the International Law Association had adopted the Budapest 
Articles of Interpretation of the Pact of Paris, which recited these principles: 
(2) A signatory State which threatens to resort to armed force for the solution of 
an international dispute or conflict is guilty of a violation of the Pact. 
(3) A signatory State which aids a violating State thereby itself violates the Pact. 
(4) In the event of a violation of the Pact by a resort to armed force or war by one 
signatory State against another, the other States may, without thereby 
committing a breach of the Pact or any rule ofInternational Law, do all or any of 
the following things:-
(a) Refuse to admit the exercise by the State violating the Pact of belligerent 
rights, such as visit and search, blockade, etc.; 
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(b) Decline to observe towards the State violating the Pact the duties 
prescribed by International Law, apart from the Pact, for a neutral in relation 
to a belligerent; 
(c) Supply the State attacked with financial or material assistance, including 
munitions of war; 
(d) Assist with armed forces the State attacked. l44 
Although some States and commentators noted when the Articles were 
approved that no State had adopted them as policy, it has been argued that the 
Articles and the 1939 Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States in Case of Aggression14S legitimated 1939-41 U.S. aid to the Allies in 
World War II before the United States entered the conflict.146 
If Article 4 (c) supplied legal backbone for Lend,Lease and similar 
arrangements while the United States was not at war, Article 4(d) was a basis 
for collective self,defense and anticipatory self,defense in particular. Besides 
aiding the Allies materially, the United States began escorting war materials 
convoys to the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, turning over escort duties to the 
Royal Navy and other allied forces at that point. The USS Niblack prosecuted 
attacks when there was a submarine threat, the USS Reuben James was sunk, 
and the USS Kearney was damaged, during these operations.147 Although no 
text of the UK,U.S. arrangement has been published, perhaps because it was 
an oral agreement or due to national security considerations, undoubtedly 
there was some sort of arrangem~nt between the two countries. 148 States do not 
send their navies into harm's way without agreeing on terms. If Article 4(d) 
restated customary and general principles norms, it was proper for U.S. 
warships to not only respond to submarine attacks on them, but also to 
anticipate attacks with appropriate force measures. 
Other Treaties Concluded before and during World War II. Defense treaties 
signed before and during World War II support a concept of anticipatory 
collective self,defense. Because the League of Nations and its treaty 
registration and publication system collapsed,149 the record of international 
agreements during 1935-45 is not complete. What is available supports a view 
that States believed treaties could provide for anticipatory collective 
self,defense. 
The USSR's pacts with France and Czechoslovakia (1935) pledged mutual 
assistance if either were subjected to "unprovoked aggression." The parties 
pledged consultation if threatened with aggression. ISO The 1936 treaty with 
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Mongolia followed the pattern. 151 When war clouds loomed for the USSR in 
1939, and the war had begun for other countries, Soviet treaties with Estonia 
and Latvia pledged that each would come to the other's assistance if there was 
"direct aggression or threat of aggression" (Estonia), or "direct attack or threat 
of attack" (Latvia) .152 
British and French eleventh-hour bilateral mutual assistance treaties with 
Poland provided for reactive self-defense, but also pledged support and 
assistance if a European Power "clearly threatened," by "any action," "directly 
or indirectly," a party's independence, and that party "considered it vital to 
resist it with its armed forces."153 
After the war began for France and Britain, they pledged aid to Turkey if it 
were involved in hostilities with a European power, or if an act of aggression 
were committed against it. Turkey agreed to observe "at least a benevolent 
neutrality" if Britain or France were engaged in hostilities with a European 
power and would aid them if they became involved in hostilities because of 
guarantees given Greece or Romania. The parties also pledged mutual 
consultation.154 The 20-year USSR-UK alliance (1942) pledged collective 
self-defense after the war if these States again became involved in hostilities 
with Germany or States associated with it.155 France's alliance with the USSR 
had similar terms.156 A USSR-UK alliance with Iran pledged defending Iran 
from "all aggression on the part of Germany,"157 presumptively contemplating 
only reactive self-defense. 
In the Western Hemisphere, the October 3, 1939, Declaration of Panama, 
negotiated while the American states were not at war, asserted: 
As a measure of continental self-protection, the American Republics, so long 
as they maintain their neutrality, are as of inherent right entitled to have those 
waters adjacent to the American continent, which they regard as of primary 
concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the commission of any 
hostile act by any non-American belligerent ... , whether such hostile act be 
attempted or made from land, sea or air. 
The Declaration applied these standards to a 300-mile zone off the American 
coasts. ISS Although the zone may have been unlawful in terms of territorial 
scope,159 because it was not proportional, the important point for this analysis 
is that the Declaration asserted a collective claim to freedom from effects of 
"attempted" hostile acts. To that extent, the Declaration implicitly declared 
a right of anticipatory collective self-defense. A 1941 Denmark-U.S. 
agreement for defending Greenland could also be said to be anticipatory in 
nature.160 When it was signed, the United States was not at war, although 
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Germany had overrun Denmark. This treaty said there was a perceived 
threat to the Western Hemisphere as stated in the 1940 Act of Havana, the 
latter "considered, in effect, an act of self,defense by the American 
republics.,,161 The Act created an emergency committee, empowered to act 
pending ratification of a convention, to assume governance of a 
belligerent's Western Hemisphere colony or possession that was "attacked" 
or "threatened." If "the need for emergency action [was] so urgent that 
action by the committee [could] not be awaited," an American republic, 
unilaterally or jointly, "[had] the right to act in the manner which its own 
defense or that of the continent require[d].,,162 This broad language left 
open a potential for anticipatory collective self,defense responses, 
particularly in view of authority given to make "urgent ... responses to 
threat[s] .... " The 1941 U.S. agreement to defend Iceland did not refer to 
the Act of Havana, but the president's response in this executive agreement 
that Iceland's defense was necessary to forestall a menace to Western 
Hemisphere security163 might be construed as collective self,defense 
anticipatory in nature. U.S. defense of Iceland would forestall menaces to 
American republics subject to the Act of Havana. 
The Potential for Anticipatory Collective Self,Defense. When the Covenant, 
the Locarno Treaty, and the Pact of Paris as interpreted by the Budapest 
Articles are considered together, there is strong argument for a view that they 
articulated the potential for anticipatory collective defense, perhaps not with 
precision. The Nyon Arrangement, and practice under it, was a clear example 
of anticipatory collective self,defense in action. The thrust of the Declaration 
of Panama and some international agreements before and during World War II 
were to the same effect. To be sure, the notion of self,preservation as equated 
with self,defense may have been discounted by then,164 but an anticipatory 
collective self,defense claim remained admissible. 
ill. Drafting the Charter and Winding Up World War IT 
Research and drafting for a new international organization to replace the 
League of Nations began during World War II. 165 The UN Charter was signed 
during the last year of that war, with original Members' ratifications often 
coming after hostilities ended. Agreements to prosecute war criminals, i.e., the 
Nuremberg Charter in 1945,166 were also signed during the war, but judgments 
came down years later. The UN's beginnings are, therefore, necessarily 
intertwined with the end of the war and the war crimes trials. 
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The drafting of the Charter as it related to collective self,defense is first 
analyzed. Trials of the major war criminals as those proceedings related to the 
issues of self,defense and anticipatory self,defense are then discussed. 
The Charter Drafting Process and Collective Self,Defense. The draft emerging 
from discussions and preparations for the San Francisco Charter conference 
did not provide for self,defense, then considered inherent in nature.167 The Act 
of Chapultepec, signed a month before the conference, included pledges of 
collective measures, including use of force, to meet threats or acts of aggression 
against a Western Hemisphere country.168 Like the interwar agreements and 
practice,169 the Act in effect declared a right to anticipatory collective 
self,defense. 
Because of Latin American States' concerns, the San Francisco conference 
included Article 51 in the Charter.11° Although some argue that the Charter 
confers a new right of collective self,defense in Article 51,171 States had been 
practicing collective self, defense, or had stated the right in so many words, in 
treaties long before the Charter was ratified.172 A related problem is whether 
there is a variant of self,defense apart from the standards of Article 51. Most 
say there is not.173 However, the Nicaragua Case, holding a parallel customary 
norm bound the litigants when the Charter could not be applied,l74 may open a 
door to developing principles opposing Charter norms175 and possibly 
outweighing Charter principles.176 
Exercising a right of collective self,defense need not be pursuant to a 
multilateral arrangement; a country may assist another under a bilateral treaty 
or without any previous treaty or other arrangement: 
[T]he travauxpreparatoires . .. [for the Charter support this view. While it is true 
that it was for purposes of fitting regional arrangements, and particularly the 
inter,American System, into the general international organization that Article 
51 was added at San Francisco. However, the discussions at San Francisco not 
only by members of regional arrangements in the proper sense of that term, but 
also by parties to bilateral treaties governing their joint security, as well as 
assistance by one State to another without any treaty obligation. Article 51 was 
deliberately transferred ... from Chapter VIII to Chapter VII with the result that 
the right of collective self,defense had become "entirely independent of the 
existence of a regional arrangement."177 
Collective self,defense does not depend on "the degree of organization or of 
treaty relationship" of states. l7B "Collective" covers more than contractual 
systems of self,defense.179 "Any Member ... is therefore authorized by the 
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Charter to assist with its armed force an attacked State, whether or not there 
has been any previous arrangement to that effect.,,18o 
Although it has been argued that an assisting State must have substantive 
rights or interests affected by an attacking State's action,181 or that an assisting 
State must have an individual right of self,defense, 182 neither is a prerequisite 
for coming to the aid of a target State. Any assisting State acts out of general 
interest in international peace and security, and can do so without a formal 
treaty as long as the target State consents.183 A State assisting a target State 
need not be subjected to armed attack, i.e., to invoke the right of self,defense 
for itself.184 However, "collective self,defense has in any event always to be 
based ultimately upon the right of an individual State to take action in 
self,defense .... If ... not linked by a previous arrangement with the attacked 
State [e.g., a bilateral or multilateral treaty, assisting states] have the right to 
use force to provide assistance on the basis of an explicit request by the [target] 
state.,,18S The political truth in today's information age may point to use of 
treaties instead of informal collective self,defense arrangements. Nevertheless, 
such informal arrangements are lawful in the Charter era. 
The foregoing analysis has not responded to the problem of States with 
divergences of views on the scope of self,defense, i.e., where some State's policy 
espouses anticipatory self,defense and the other State(s) has or have a more 
restrictive, reactive ("take the first hit") policy,186 or where States may share 
the same general policy, e.g., that of anticipatory self,defense, but differ as to 
situations and circumstances when the norm applies.187 
Where an assisting State with an anticipatory self,defense policy comes to 
the aid of a State with a restrictive view, it will be presumed in the case of prior 
treaty or other arrangements or a request in the absence of these that the 
restrictive view State negotiated the treaty or other arrangement, or made the 
request, with knowledge of the assisting State's policy, and that the assisting 
State is free, but is not obliged, to employ anticipatory self,defense to fulfill its 
treaty or arrangement obligations. In the reverse situation, where a restrictive 
view State assists a State with a policy of anticipatory self,defense, the same 
principles should obtain. The assisting State may, but is not obliged, to invoke 
anticipatory self,defense; the anticipatory self,defense State knew or should 
have known of the self,imposed limitations on the assisting State. In either 
case, there is no need, as a matter oflaw, for the target State to request a kind or 
degree of assistance from the assisting State. However, as a matter of policy, the 
target State may request, and the assisting State should consider, a certain kind 
or degree of assistance for the target State. Thus, a target State might ask for 
self,defense help that amounts to reactive and not anticipatory action; in that 
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case, the assisting State must consider whether it can, as a matter of policy, stop 
at that line, commensurate with the perceived need to assure safety of its 
contributed forces or perhaps its municipal governance limitations, e.g., action 
taken by its parliament. In the reverse situation, where an anticipatory 
self,defense country asks for what amounts to anticipatory self,defense help 
from a State espousing a restrictive view, the same principles should apply. 
There is a critical difference between a treaty relationship and a more 
informal request or arrangement when a situation develops. Failure to comply 
with a treaty term as perhaps understood by prior interpretive practice carries 
with it risk of denunciation 188 or claims of breach,189 fundamental change of 
circumstances,190 impossibility of performance,191 etc. 
The foregoing assumes a bilateral relationship, by treaty or otherwise. The 
problem is more complicated in circumstances of multilateral relationships. 
If a State or States with the same anticipatory self,defense view aid a group 
of States, all of whom have the same reactive view, or if a reactive view State or 
States aid a group of States, all of whom espouse anticipatory self,defense, the 
result is the same as in the bilateral context. 
Suppose, however, some assisting States have anticipatory self,defense 
positions and others have a reactive self,defense policy, and target States have 
_ similarly differing views. Second, suppose some assisting States have differing 
anticipatory defense views,l92 and others have differing reactive self,defense 
policies, and the same is true for target States. The same, and perhaps greater, 
risks of denunciations or claims of treaty breach, fundamental change of 
circumstances or impossibility, might be lodged.193 One solution to this 
problem might be the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties approach on 
reservations,194 i.e., that anticipatory self,defense applies only as to those states 
that mutually agree on principles and that otherwise the lowest common 
denominator, perhaps a diminished scope for anticipatory self,defense or only 
reactive self,defense, applies as between parties.195 In a multinational military 
operation, this could create the kind of legal nightmare that Vienna 
Convention analysis promises for multilateral treaties.196 Alternatives might be 
an analogy to the traditional rule for treaty reservations, i.e., all States must 
concur197 or assistance will end. Another alternative is consultation in a given 
situation, with a treaty term to that effect if a multilateral agreement is 
negotiated, instead of relying on arrangements or target State request(s). That 
appears to be the direction of mutual defense treaties.198 
There are two more issues involved with claims of self,defense. First, States 
may change policies after ratifying a treaty, perhaps moving from reactive 
self,defense to an anticipatory self,defense posture. A State may declare a shift 
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within policy, e.g., what was not considered a proper circumstance for claiming 
anticipatory self,defense yesterday is today within the scope of a proper claim. 
Might such a shift in policy at the least cause discomfort among treaty partners, 
and at worst trigger denunciations or claims of treaty breach, fundamental 
change of circumstances, or impossibility of performance?199 
The second involves the attacking State's posture. If an attacking State, a 
target State and an assisting State share common self,defense positions, this 
would tend to legitimize assisting State operations as a manifestation of local, 
or special, custom.2oo If the assisting and target States take one view of the 
issue, and the attacking State has another, this might be grounds for a claim 
that an opponent has not engaged in legitimate action. Thus, if an assisting 
State would wish to assert that it is acting within the law, it could more safely 
do so if it acts according to its allies' or opponents' views. Where a State has an 
anticipatory self,defense view, this might mean employing military force in only 
a reactive self,defense mode, or at least claiming to do so, if the opponent or 
target State has adopted the restrictive view, This is a policy decision and not a 
question of law; it is akin to rules of engagement (ROE) more restrictive than 
actions the law permits. ROE for combat forces may provide for wartime and 
peacetime scenarios, in which rights to individual or collective self,defense, 
including anticipatory self,defense, may be more circumscribed than the law 
would allow.201 
Many of these issues do not find responses in reported practice or decisional 
law. 
The War Crimes Trials and Self,Defense. The Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal relied on the Pact of Paris in its findings of guilt.202 The 
Tribunal rejected defense claims that Germany had acted in self,defense.203 
Admiral Erich Raeder's theory was that Germany occupied Norway as a 
necessary act of self,defense to forestall Allied landings there. Citing the 
Caroline Case,204 the Tribunal recognized a right of anticipatory self,defense: 
"[P]reventative action in foreign territory is justified only in the case of an 
instant and overwhelming necessity for self,defense, leaving no choice of 
means and no moment for deliberation." This was not true for German 
invasions of Denmark and Norway, the Tribunal ruled.205 The defense was 
unable to demonstrate "an intention formed in good faith and honesty of 
conviction to protect one's safety, that safety being immediately 
threatened.,,206 
In the Tokyo trials involving Japanese accuseds, a defense was that because 
the Netherlands had declared war on Japan before Japan had made a formal 
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war declaration,207 attacks against Dutch Asian territories were in self,defense. 
The Tribunal held the Netherlands had acted in anticipatory self,defense: 
The fact that the Netherlands, ... fully apprised of the imminence of the attack 
[by Japan], in self,defense declared war against Japan on 8th December and thus 
officially recognised the existence of a state of war which had been begun by 
Japan, cannot change that war from a war of aggression [by] ... Japan into 
something other than that. 
There was strong evidence of]apan's preparations to invade the Dutch East 
Indies, and the Netherlands chose to declare war before Japan's formal 
declaration. The Netherlands did not then have self,defense treaties with the 
Allies, insofar as the published record shows. However, her acting in concert 
with the Allies immediately afterward is some evidence of informal collective 
self,defense, a concept recognized before and after ratification of the 
Charter.2os 
These decisions, coming just after the General Assembly had confirmed the 
Nuremberg Charter as customary law,z09 strongly evidence210 a right of 
anticipatory self,defense and perhaps, for the Netherlands, the practice of 
informal collective self,defense arrangements. 
Anticipatory Collective Self,Defense at the Creation of the UN System. The 
record during and just after World War II does not show that the law of 
collective self,defense, including anticipatory collective self,defense, was 
anything other than what had gone before. The Charter drafters included a 
right of collective self,defense, largely at the behest of parties to the Act of 
Chapultepec, but they did so in the context of the Pact of Paris, the Locarno 
Treaties, and other agreements, e.g., Nyon21t and bilateral treaties in 1935 and 
thereafter.2t2 Invoking collective self,defense under the Charter could come 
through formal treaty, informal arrangement, or by target State request.2t3 
Problems of varying views on the scope of self,defense within these modalities 
were not resolved when this norm was written into the Charter.214 The 
Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments were not handed down until after the 
Charter was in force, but they confirm a right of anticipatory self,defense.215 
IV. Collective Self .. Defense Treaties during the Charter Era 
Bilateral and multilateral defense agreements have been concerned with 
collective self,defense since 1945.216 Article 51 states a right and not a duty of 
self,defensej however, the right is transformed into a duty in self,defense 
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treaties.217 Part IV.A discusses these arrangements, and Part IV. B argues that 
national decision makers should be bound by what they knew or should have 
known at the time the decision to respond in anticipatory self,defense was 
made, the standard used in the law of armed conflict, i.e., the jus in bello. 
Treaties Providing for Collective Self,Defense. The Act of Chapultepec, 
instrumental in shaping Article 51 of the Charter,218 was replaced by the Rio 
Treaty (1947), Article 3(1) of which provides that armed attack on an 
American State is considered an attack on all American states and that each 
party undertakes to assist in meeting the attack "in the exercise of the inherent 
right of individual or collective self,defense recognized by Article 51. ... " 
Article 3 (1) is nearly identical with Part 1(3) of the Act.219 Undoubtedly, the 
Treaty drafters wished to carry forward the meaning of the inherent right of 
self,defense incorporated in the Act in 1945, which had been adopted in 
Article 51.220 
The Treaty also declares that" [0] n the request of the State or States directly 
attacked" and until there is a decision by the Inter,American System's Organ 
of Consultation, each party may determine "immediate measures" it may take 
to fulfill the collective self,defense obligation.221 These self,defense measures 
can proceed until the UN Security Council takes measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security.222 If any American State's 
inviolability, territorial integrity, sovereignty, or political independence is 
affected by aggression that is not an armed attack, by a conflict, "or by any 
other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America," the Treaty's 
Organ of Consultation must meet immediately to agree on measures to be 
taken, in case of aggression, to assist a victim of aggression, or on measures that 
should be taken for common defense and the maintenance of peace and 
security.223 
Article 4 of the 1948 treaty creating the Western European Union (WEU) 
provides similarly that if a party is "the object of an armed attack in Europe, the 
other ... Parties will, in accordance with ... Article 51 ... , afford the party so 
attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.,,224 The 
Treaty provided for a Consultative Council "[flor consulting together on all 
the questions dealt with in the ... Treaty, which shall be organized as to be able 
to exercise its functions continuously.,,225 (In 1955 the Council was renamed 
the Council of Western European Union, but otherwise its functions remain 
the same.)226 The 1948 agreement also provides for reporting to the Security 
Council and ending WEU action when the Council takes measures necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Nothing in the Treaty 
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"prejudice[s] in any way the obligations of the ... Parties under the ... 
Charter .... "227 There is nothing in the Treaty to indicate that its drafters did 
not consider that they were carrying forward the understanding of the Charter 
drafters, i.e., that WEU States can invoke the inherent right of self,defensej the 
Treaty's explicit reference to Article 51 tends to confirm this. The 1954 WEU 
Protocols provide for forces to be contributed for self,defense.zz8 Protocol I 
declares that parties "shall work in close co,operation" with NATO, and that 
the Council and its agency will rely on NATO military authorities for 
information and advice.229 The WEU, inactive for more than a decade, was 
revived in 1984 in connection with European Union integrationj23o the 
1980-88 Tanker War also spurred action.231 
In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signedj Article 5 provides in part that 
... [AJrmed attack against one or more of [the parties] in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently [the 
parties] agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of 
the right of individual or collective self,defense recognized by Article 51 ... will 
assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the 
use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic 
area.23Z 
Specific reference to Article 51 carries forward an understanding that parties 
have inherent rights to individual and collective self,defense. Article 7 adds 
that the Treaty "does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any 
way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are [UN] 
members . . . , or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.,,233 States also agreed to 
"consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of any ... Part[y] is threatened."z34 
In 1950 the Arab League signed a Joint Defense Treaty, whose Article 2 
provides: 
... Contracting States agree that an armed aggression, directed against any 
one or more of them or against their forces, shall be considered as directed 
against all .... [T]hey agree, in virtue of the right oflegitimate self,defence, both 
individual and collective, to assist at once the State or States so attacked and to 
adopt immediately, both individually and collectively, all ... measures and 
means at their disposal, including ... employment of armed force, to repulse the 
aggression and restore peace and security. 
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The Security Council must be informed immediately of an aggression and steps 
and measures taken.23S Although it does not refer to Article 51 specifically, the 
Treaty could not contravene individual and collective self~defense rights 
proclaimed in the Charter.236 Article 3 also pledges: 
... States shall consult together at the request of anyone of them, whenever 
the integrity of the territory, independence or security of anyone of them is 
exposed to danger. 
In the event of the imminent risk of war or the advent of a sudden 
international development believed to be dangerous, ... States shall at once 
hasten to coordinate their measures as the situation may require.237 
The latter clause directly supports a view that the inherent right of collective 
self~defense includes a right of anticipatory self~defense. That the League 
contemplated more than reactive collective self~defense is also supported by 
the Treaty's Military Annex, Article 1 (a); the Permanent Military Committee 
created by the Treaty is charged with "[p]repar[ing] ... military plans to meet 
all foreseeable dangers or any armed aggression which might be attempted 
against one or more ... Contracting States or their forces.,,238 
In 1951 Australia, New Zealand and the United States concluded the 
ANZUS Pact. Similar to other mutual security agreements, and modeled on the 
North Atlantic Treaty,239 the Pact provides for consultation.24o There is 
"recogni[tion] that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any ... Part[y] 
would be dangerous to [other parties'] peace and safety." Parties will "meet the 
common danger in accordance with [their] constitutional processes." Like 
earlier agreements, there is a pledge of reporting to the Security Council and 
ending self~defense measures once the Council takes necessary measures.241 
Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, however, there is no statement that attack 
on one is an attack on all.242 However, the "armed attack" provision should 
receive the same construction as the phrase in the Charter, Article 51.243 
The 1954 SEATO Treaty includes similar language on aggression by armed 
attack; consultation after a threat to a party's territory, sovereignty or political 
independence; and reporting to the Security Council. The Treaty requires a 
government's invitation or consent before action can be taken on that 
member's territory.244 The Pacific Charter (1954) declares parties' 
"determin[ation] to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in 
the treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or 
territorial integrity.,,245 Although SEATO Treaty obligations remain in effect, 
its supporting organization ceased to exist in 1975.246 France, the United 
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Kingdom and the United States are among the SEATO and Pacific Charter 
members.247 
The Second Balkan Pact was signed in 1954, a partial successor to the 1933 
Little Entente; its effective life was only a couple of years.248 Like its 
predecessor, Pact parties pledged consultation but "immediate ... " collective 
defense against "armed aggression," invoking Article 51 of the Charter. Thus, 
if Pact parties asserted individual claims to anticipatory self,defense, they 
would have incorporated those claims by joining the Pact.249 
In 1955 some Arab League members signed the Baghdad Pact; Article 1 
declared: "Consistent with Article 51 ... Parties will co,operate for their 
security and defence," perhaps through special agreements.250 Unlike the 
North Atlantic and other treaties, it did not provide for crisis consultation 
beyond agreement to determine measures to be taken once the Pact was in 
effect.251 Members included Iran, Iraq (1955-59), Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom. A political failure, it dissolved in 1979.252 
In 1955 the USSR and its European satellites signed the now,defunct253 
Warsaw Pact. Its Article 4 paralleled the North Atlantic Treaty: 
In the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or more of the ... Parties ... 
by any State or group of States, each ... Party ... shall, in the exercise of the right 
of individual or collective self, defence, in accordance with Article 51 ... , afford 
the State or States so attacked immediate assistance, individually and in 
agreement with the other ... Parties ... , by all the means it considers necessary, 
including ... armed force .... Parties ... shall consult together immediately 
concerning the joint measures necessary to restore and maintain international 
peace and security. 
Measures taken under this article shall be reported to the Security Council in 
accordance with the ... Charter. These measures shall be discontinued as soon 
as the . . . Council takes the necessary action to restore and maintain 
international peace and security.254 
Pact parties pledged to consult immediately to provide for joint defense and 
maintaining international peace and security, if a member "consider[ed] that a 
threat of armed attack on one or more of the ... Parties to the Treaty ha[d] 
arisen .... " The North Atlantic Treaty, it will be recalled, provides for 
consultations if a party believes a member State's territorial integrity, political 
independence, or security is threatened.255 
Cold War era bilateral defense treaties also had similar language. Three 
binding the United States are typical. The Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, 
Article 4, declares that "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the 
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Pacific Area on either ... Part[y] would be dangerous to its own peace and 
security and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in 
accordance with its constitutional processes." In common with the multilateral 
treaties, the Philippines,U.S. agreement pledges reporting to the Security 
Council and ending defense measures when the Council takes measures 
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.256 Armed 
attacks are deemed to include attacks on metropolitan territories of either 
State, island territories under their jurisdiction, or their armed forces, public 
vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific.257 Like the multilaterals, the parties pledge to 
consult "whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, 
political independence or security of either ... is threatened by external armed 
attack in the Pacific.,,258 The Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty259 and 
the agreement with J apan260 have similar terms. The USSR concluded bilateral 
agreements with its European satellites to defend against "aggression," 
sometimes naming Germany as the possible aggressor, or building on World 
War II arrangements; the Warsaw Pact was not intended to supersede these 
treaties.261 Similarly, Britain and France ratified the Treaty of Dunkirk (1947) 
before WEU was formed; the Treaty states it was designed to prevent Germany 
from again becoming a "danger to the peace," and like the abortive Versailles 
bilateral agreements promised mutual support if Germany committed 
aggression.262 Depending on how aggression might be defined,263 the plain 
language of these agreements could support a view that they contemplated 
anticipatory and reactive self,defense, despite some States' policy of reactive 
self,defense. 
Each of these agreements requires consultation when there is a threat to a 
party's territorial integrity, political independence, security, or the like. Except 
for the ANZUS Pact, they say that armed attack on one is an attack on all. 
Without exception, they refer to Charter requirements of reporting to the 
Security Council, etc. 
Do these terms leave room for anticipatory collective self,defense as a 
response to a threat? Under a restrictive view of self,defense, i.e., that a target 
State must await the first blow,264 Article 51 allows response by State A after 
State B, with whom State A has a mutual self,defense treaty, has suffered an 
attack. Assuming there is a right of anticipatory self,defense,265 State B could 
respond before receiving the first blow, subject to necessity and proportionality 
principles.266 The remaining question is whether State A, which has not been a 
target of attack, could respond to an attack on State B and successfully claim 
collective anticipatory self,defense. 
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For reasons grounded in Charter law, the language of the collective 
self~defense treaties themselves, the history of collective self~defense 
agreement negotiations, and the practical realities of modem methods of 
warfare,267 there is a right to anticipatory collective self~defense in the Charter 
era. If there must be consultation before a self~defense response, as most 
agreements require,268 there is nothing in the agreements forbidding 
consultation before the first blow is struck. "The right of Members of the 
United Nations to prepare in advance for collective defence is implicit in their 
right to have recourse to collective defence.,,269 Since a right to collective 
self~defense is a customary norm, in terms of the treaties and practice before 
the Charter,270 it is implicit in that customary right as well. Consultation, or 
planning, can include measures to be taken in anticipatory collective 
self~defense. The Charter does not forbid planning for individual or collective 
self~defense, whether the response be reactive or anticipatory in nature. 
Article 51 of the Charter, a treaty that has as its first and primary principle 
and purpose the maintenance of international peace and security,271 lists 
alternatives of the inherent rights of individual or collective self~defense. The 
same conditions applying to individual self~defense, e.g., necessity and 
proportionality, apply to collective self~defense. 272 If this is so, a right of 
collective self~defense is coterminous with a right of individual self~defense, 
and if individual self~defense includes anticipatory self~defense as 
commentators and States argue,273 collective self~defense includes that option 
too. 
Given the history of negotiations contemporaneous with the Charter (the 
Act of Chapultepec274) and running through the Rio Treaty (1947), the WEU 
Treaty (1948), the North Atlantic Treaty (1949), the Arab League Joint 
Defence Treaty (1950), and more recent agreements, there is evidence in the 
language of the agreements themselves to support a view that negotiators had 
anticipatory self~defense in mind, particularly with respect to consultations to 
deter aggression, including armed aggression.275 When the Charter's 
recognition of sovereignty is combined with the "inherent" right of self~defense 
and the supremacy of Charter law over inconsistent treaties,276 parties could 
not contract away an inherent right of self~defense, including collective 
self~defense, guaranteed by the Charter. And because the Charter negotiators 
operated against a background of prior treaty law, practice, judicial opinions, 
and commentators' views supporting a right of anticipatory self~defense, 277 that 
right in the collective self~defense context carried forward into the Charter era. 
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The Temporal Problem: When Does Liability heme? Convictions at Nuremberg 
were based on what defendants knew, or should have known, when they decided 
to invade other States.278 Since then, there has been no authoritative statement on 
whether liability accrues based on what decision makers know, or should know, 
when a reactive or anticipatory self,defense response is contemplated. 
Commentators have been tempted to justify opinions, at least in part, on 
evidence available after a decision, perhaps years later.279 
The developing law for jus in bello confirms that the proper standard for 
establishing liability is what decision makers know, or should have known, 
when an operation was authorized. Hindsight can be 20/20; decisions at the 
time may be clouded with the fog of war.280 
Declarations of understanding281 of four countries to 1977 Protocol 1282 to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949283 state that for protection of civilians in 
Article 51,284 protection of civilian objects in Article 52,285 and precautions to 
be taken in attacks set forth in Article 57,286 a commander should be liable 
based on that commander's assessment of information available at the relevant 
time, i.e., when a decision is made.287 Two of the 1980 Conventional Weapons 
Convention's288 protocols have similar terms, i.e., a commander is only bound 
by information available when a decision to attack is made.289 
Protocol I, with its understandings, and the Conventional Weapons 
Convention protocols are on their way to acceptance among States.290 These 
treaties' common statement, in text or declarations, that commanders will be 
held accountable based on information they have at the time for determining 
whether attacks are necessary and proportional has become a nearly universal 
norm. The San Remo Manual recognizes it as the standard for naval warfare.291 
It can be said with fair confidence that this is the customary standard for jus in 
bello. It should be the standard for jus ad bellum. A national leader directing a 
self,defense response, whether reactive or anticipatory, should be held to the 
same standard as a commander in the field deciding on attacks. A national 
leader should be held accountable for what he or she, or those reporting to the 
leader, knew or reasonably should have known, when a decision was made to 
respond in self,defense. 
v. Conclusions and Projections for the Future 
Since the Congress of Vienna attempted to impose order on 
post,Napoleonic Europe, countries great and small have tried to preserve 
peace and promote national security interests through collective security 
systems. Some arrangements have been general, e.g., the alliance system after 
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Waterloo. Others have been regional, e.g., treaties negotiated during the 
Crimean War. Many have been bilateral. Although many had terms stating a 
reactive self,defense theory, others provided for anticipatory self,defense. 
Practice of those times reveals use of informal arrangements as well.292 
The new factor emerging after the Franco,Prussian War was defensive 
alliance systems, often in secret treaties, which could promote aggressive 
coalition warfare, but which provided for reactive and anticipatory collective 
self,defense. Arrayed against these alliances were bilateral and multilateral 
agreements that also bespoke reactive and anticipatory collective 
self,defense.293 
The Treaty of Versailles and other agreements ending World War I 
established the League of Nations. The Covenant of the League, Part I of the 
postwar peace treaties, did not address self,defense directly, although the 
Covenant can be read as not excluding self,defense, including anticipatory 
self,defense. The Pact of Paris and its reservation through diplomatic notes, 
while outlawing aggressive war as national policy, preserved an inherent right 
of self,defense. Based on the treaty record before the Great War, this inherent 
right included anticipatory collective self,defense as an option for preserving 
international peace and security. The Nyon Arrangement, practice under it, 
other international agreements, the Budapest Articles, and international 
military tribunal decisions after World War II confirmed continuation of a 
right of anticipatory collective self,defense. There is also evidence that more 
informal arrangements could be concluded.294 
Thus, when Charter Article 51 provided in 1945 for an inherent right of 
individual and collective self,defense in the context of the contemporary Act 
of Chapultepec, the right the Charter negotiators intended as inherent 
included a right of anticipatory collective self,defense.295 The record of 
multilateral treaties, bilateral agreements and State practice since 1945 
confirms that right, which includes a right to conclude more informal 
arrangements. And while prior consultation may be a customary prerequisite to 
exercise of that right, consultation may include prior planning, including 
planning for anticipatory responses. There is nothing in the Caroline Case to 
forbid such.296 The inherent right to anticipatory collective self,defense, 
including a right to engage in more informal arrangements, continues today as 
it has existed since the Congress of Vienna. States can no longer adopt war as 
an instrument of national policy, but beyond that limitation, a right to 
self,defense, anticipatory or reactive, individual or collective, continues as 
before.297 
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Anticipatory collective self,defense, like unilateral anticipatory 
self,defense, is always tempered by necessity and proportionality principles. 
Nevertheless, the treaty record since 1815, although tortured, occasionally 
obscurely' phrased, and sometimes muffled through secret treaties or 
reservations not part of published agreements, demonstrates that international 
law has recognized, and continues to recognize, a right of anticipatory 
collective self,defense. If confidence and participation in the UN system 
through affirmative Security Council action continues, it is likely that there 
will be more, not less, use of anticipatory responses,298 followed by Council 
decisions299 on further methods to contain threats to the peace, breaches of the 
peace, threats to States' territorial integrity, aggression, or invasion. One issue 
that should be resolved in the future is the temporal problem. States and their 
leadership should be held to what they knew, or should have known, when a 
decision for anticipatory collective response is taken.30D 
Some multilateral self,defense treaties negotiated since World War II have 
been abrogated (i.e., the Warsaw Pacr3°1) or have fallen into disuetude (e.g., 
SEA T0302). Others, e.g., the Rio303 and North Atlantic304 treaties, remain in 
force. Bilateral agreements have come and gone.30S The surviving agreements' 
roles may be changing.306 New agreements, or perhaps informal 
arrangements,307 may be negotiated. What role anticipatory collective 
self,defense may play in these evolving developments is not clear. However, 
the terms of prior agreements, negotiated before and after 1945, and State 
practice, show that it would be appropriate, as a matter of international law, to 
include anticipatory self,defense as a response option until the Council acts 
pursuant to Article 51. How anticipatory collective self,defense as a 
peremptory norm (jus cogens) fits into this analysis, if at all, is also an inquiry for 
the future.303 
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would not "affect the validity of international engagements, such as ... regional understandings 
like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." See also infra notes 36, 
133-36, 158-63, 168-70, 218-23 and accompanying text. 
18. Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, Nov. 20, 1815, pmb!., 65 Conso!. T.S. 296, referring 
to Treaty of Alliance, Mar. 15, 1815,64 id. 27. See also PALMER, supra note 15, at 6,25-28. 
19. Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, supra note 18, arts. 3-4, 6, 65 Conso!. T.S. at 
297-98. 
20. Protocol of Conference, Nov. 15, 1818, 69 id. 365. The Concert of Europe "formed 
what was arguably the most successful European Settlement" and was a set of informal 
understandings in which European great powers acted to defuse problems that might lead to 
conflict among them. MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE DAWN OF PEACE IN EUROPE 106 (1996) . 
See also DONALD KAGAN, ON THE ORIGINS OF WAR. AND THE PRESERVATON OF PEACE 83 
(1995); Gross, supra note 7, at 20. 
21. A decade later Russia and Turkey concluded Treaty of Defensive Alliance, July 8/26, 
1833, arts. 1,3-4,84 Conso!. T.S. 1,3-5, providing that Russia would furnish forces to Turkey 
for defense against attack. Final Act of Ministerial Conferences to Complete and Consolidate 
Organization of the Germanic Confederation, May 15, 1820, arts. 35-41, 47, 71 id. 89, 116-18, 
contemplated collective action for threatened attacks as well as invasions. Treaty of Peace, Aug. 
23, 1866, Aus.·Pruss., art. 4, 133 id. 71,82 dissolved the Confederation. 
22. PALMER, supra note 15, at 81-82. Fearful of an attempted Spanish reconquest of South 
America's Andean states, Bolivia, Chile, New Granada (now Colombia), and Peru signed the 
Treaty of Lima, Feb. 8, 1848, which established a confederation of the signatories to meet the 
perceived threat. The danger dissipated; the treaty was never ratified. STOETZER, supra note 17, 
at9. 
23. See generally NWP 9A, supra note 1, 114.3.2.1, citing Bunn, supra note 1, at 70; R.Y. 
Jennings, The Caroline and Mcleod Cases, 32 AM.]. INT'L L. 82, 89 (1938); Letter of U.S. 
Secretary of State Daniel \Vebster to UK Ambassador Lord Alexander B. Ashburton, Aug. 6, 
1842, reprinted in Destruction of the Caroline, 2 MOORE, DIGEST § 217, at 411-12; Letter of 
Secretary Webster to UK Minister Henry S. Fox, Apr. 24, 1841, in 1 KENNETH E. SHEWMAKER, 
THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS 58, 67 (1983).NWP 1-14,supranote 
1,4.3.2.1 n. 32 departs from this language, saying that "the Webster formulation is clearly too 
restrictive today, particularly given the nature and lethality of modem weapons systems which 
may be employed with little, if any, warning." 
24. For analysis of wartime diplomacy, see PALMER, supra note 15, at 101-10; TAYLOR, 
supra note 17, ch. 4. 
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25. Convention Relative to Military Aid to Be Given to Turkey, Apr. 10, 1854, Fr.-Gr. 
Brit., arts. 2, 4-5,111 Consol. T.S. 393, 395-97. 
26. Treaty of Offensive and Defensive Alliance, Apr. 20,1854, Aus.-Pruss., id. 413, 424. 
27. Later arrangements would determine forces' numbers, description, and destination. 
Prussia was invited to accede. Treaty of Alliance, Dec. 2, 1854, arts. 3,6, 112 id. 295, 298. 
28. Compare id. with Military Convention, Jan. 26, 1855, id. 453. 
29. Common agreement would determine forces' numbers, description, and destination. 
Sweden pledged not to cede or exchange territory or give pasturage or fishery rights "or rights of 
any other nature whatsoever, ... and to resist any pretension ... by Russia ... to establish the 
existence of any ... Rights aforesaid." Treaty of Stockholm, Nov. 21, 1855, arts. 1-2, 114 id. 13, 
15-16. The United States observed "benevolent neutrality," favoring Russia, dUring the war. 
JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE LONG PEACE: INQUIRIES INTO THE HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR 5 
(1987). 
30. General Treaty for Re-Establishment of Peace, Mar. 30, 1856, art. 8, 114 Consol. T.S. 
409,414, ending the Crimean War, provided for mediating future disputes before recourse to 
force and was a forerunner of U.N. CHARTER art. 33. Protocol of Conference, Apr. 14, 1856, 1 
HURST, supra note 17, at 334, suggested the procedure be available for future disputes. In the 
Western Hemisphere, as a result of the William Walker filibustering expeditions, Chile, 
Ecuador, and Peru signed but did not ratify the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and Confederation, 
which provided that if the United States attacked one or more parties, all would unite against the 
aggressor. The treaty was never ratified. STOETZER, supra note 17, at 9-10. 
31. Count Nigra, Notes on Results of Meeting between Napoleon III of France and Count 
Cavour of Piedmont, July 20, 1858, arts. 1, 3-4, 1 HURST, supra note 17, at 401. 
32. Treaty Relative to Independence and Neutrality of Belgium, Aug. 9, 1870, Gr. 
Brit.·Pruss., arts. 1-2, 141 Consol. T.S. 435, 438-39; Treaty Relative to Independence and 
Neutrality of Belgium, Aug. 11, 1870, Fr.-Gr. Brit., arts. 1-2, id. 441,443-44. Treaty Relative to 
Separation of Belgium from Holland, Nov. 15, 1831, art. 7, 82 id. 255, 259; Treaty of London, 
Apr. 19, 1839, art. 7,88 id. 445, 449, also had guaranteed Belgian neutrality. German violation of 
Belgian neutrality was a cause of World War I. KAGAN, supra note 20, at 61,129,204. 
33. PALMER, supra note 15, at 118. 
34. The Russian fleets were then wintering in New York and San Francisco. JAMES P. 
DUFFY, LINCOLN'S ADMIRAL: THE aVIL WAR CAMPAIGNS OF DAVID FARRAGUT 220-21 
(1997). The Russian visit came at a low point in Union fortunes; the Russians were feted in New 
York, San Francisco, and Washington. Whether Russia and the United States discussed an 
alliance then or in 1861 has been debated; most assert that there were at least conversations 
toward that end. See D.P. CROOK, THE NORTH, THE SOUTH,AND THE POWERS 1861-1865, at 
317-18 (1974); DONALDSON JORDAN & EDWIN J. PRATT,EUROPEANDTHEAMERICANCNIL 
WAR 200-01 (1969); ALBERT A. WOLDMAN, LINCOLN AND THE RUSSIANS ch. 9 (1952). 
GADDIS, supra note 29, at 5-6, linked this proposed cooperation to U.S. "benevolent neutrality" 
during the Crimean War. 
35. See supra note 17, infra notes 177--85 and accompanying text. 
36. Treaty of Alliance Against Paraguay, May 1, 1865, art. 1, 131 Consol. T.S. 119, 120; 
Treaty of Union and Defensive Alliance, Jan. 23, 1865, art. 1, 130 id. 401, 402; Treaty of 
Alliance, July 10, 1865, 131 id. 305, 306; see also STOETZER, supra note 17, at 10, 266. A war with 
some of these States sputtered on until the United States mediated an armistice. See Armistice, 
Apr. 11, 1871, 143 Consol. T.S. 129, 132. 
37. Definitive Treaty of Peace, May 10, 1871, Fr.-Ger., 143 Consol. T.S. 163. 
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38. ROBERT H. FERRELL, PEACE IN THEIR TIME: THE ORIGINS OF THE KELLOGG-BRIAND 
PACT 6 (1968), referring to Hague Convention (III) Relative to Opening ofHostUities, Oct. 18, 
1907, arts. 1,3,36 Stat. 2259,2271 (Hague III). 
39. Hague Convention (II) Respecting Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of 
Contract Deb"ts, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, id. 2241, 2251 (Hague II). 
40. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 255. 
41. GADDIS, supra note 29, at 222, notes that the simpler alliance systems of the Cold War, 
coinciding with much of the Charter era, are more durable than those of the past century, which 
depended on skill of a Metternich or Bismarck to hold them together. 
42. For analysis of alliance systems since World \Var II in the context of collective 
self-defense, see infra notes 216-78 and accompanying text. George K. Walker, Integration and 
Disintegration in Europe: Reordering the Treaty Map of the Continent, 6 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 1, 
12-24 (1993) surveys development of European economic systems, particularly the European 
Union. 
43. Agreement, May 25/June 6, 1873, Aust.-Hung.-Russ., arts. 2-3, 146 Consol. T.S. 217, 
220-21, to which Germany acceded Oct. 22, 1873. See 2 HURST, supra note 17, at 508; PALMER, 
supra note 15, at 151. 
44. Convention of Defensive Alliance, June 4, 1878, Gr. Brit.-Turk., art. 1, 153 Consol. 
T.S. 67, 69. 
45. Treaty of Alliance, Oct. 7, 1879, Aust.-Hung.-Ger., arts. 1-2, 155 id. 303, 307, 
extended for five years by Protocol in Regard to Prolongation of Alliance of 1879, Mar. 22, 1883, 
2 HURST, supra note 17, at 629. Protocol Concerning Continuation of Treaty of 1879 and 
Protocol of 1883, June 1, 1902, Aust.-Hung.-Ger., id. at 732, extended the arrangement 
indefinitely on a three-year renewal basis. 
46. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 264; see also WILLIAM L. LANGER, EUROPEAN ALLIANCES 
AND ALIGNMENTS 171-96 (1931); PALMER, supra note 15, at 163-66, reporting talks between 
French and Russian staffs through the next decade. 
47. This provision applied if a party were at war with Turkey, but only after previous 
agreement among the three States. League of the Three Emperors, June 18, 1881, art. 1, 158 
Consol. T.S. 461. Treaty Concerning Prolongation of Treaty of 1881, Apr. 15, 1884, 2 HURST, 
supra note 17 at 634, extended and slightly modified the 1881 agreement. In Treaty of Alliance, 
June 16/28, 1881, Aus.-Hung.-Serbia, 159 Consol. T.S. 1, the parties pledged benevolent 
neutrality if either was at war; Treaty Prolonging the Treaty of 1881, Jan. 28JFeb. 9, 1889, 
Aus.-Hung.-Serbia, 171 id. 485, extended it to 1895. Declaration Affirming Engagement of 
Mutual Neutrality, Oct. 2/15, 1904, Aust.-Hung.-Russ., 196 id. 392, 394 pledg~d reciprocal 
"loyal neutrality" if either was involved in war with a third State; the treaty did not apply to the 
Balkans. For analysis of the League, see LANGER, supra note 46, at 196-212; TAYLOR, supra note 
17, at 279-72, 304, who says the League was a "fair-weather system" that "worked only so long as 
there was no conflict." 
48. Treaty of Defensive Alliance, Feb. 6,1873, Bol.-Peru, art. 1, 145 Consol. T.S. 475, 484, 
and Protocol, May 5, 1879, id. 482; see also Treaty of Peace and Amity, Oct. 20, 1883, 
Chile-Peru, 162 id. 453; Armistice Convention, Apr. 4, 1884, Bol.-Chile, 163 id. 423; STOETZER, 
supra note 17, at 10, 266. 
49. LANGER, supra note 46, at 246. 
50. Treaty of Alliance, May 20,1882, arts. 2-3,160 Consol. T.S. 237, 241. 
51. Id., arts. 4-6, renewed by Second Treaty of Triple Alliance, Feb. 20,1887, art. 1, 169 id. 
139, 141. Separate Treaty, Feb. 20, 1887, Aus.-Hung.-Italy, id. 143; Separate Treaty, Feb. 20, 
1887, Ger.-Italy, id. 147, required Germany to go to war ifItaly went to war to protect its African 
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interests. Germany and Russia signed the Reinsurance Treaty, June 18, 1887, arts. 1-2, 169 id. 
317, pledging that if either went to war with a third Great Power, the other would observe 
benevolent neutrality, and recognized Russia's interest in the Balkan peninsula and that the 
Straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles should always remain open. An Additional Protocol, 
June 18, 1887, id. 323-24, provided that Germany would help Russia establish a regular 
government in Bulgaria, and that Germany would be a benevolent neutral if Russia had to 
defend the entrance to the Black Sea. The Reinsurance Treaty was allowed to lapse in 1890. 
PALMER, supra note 15, at 179. A third Triple Alliance was negotiated in Treaty of Alliance, 
May 6, 1891, 175 Consol. T.S. 105. Fourth Treaty ofTriple Alliance, June 28, 1902, art. 14, 191 
id. 286, 295, renewed the alliance for six years, with a possibility of a further six-year renewal. 
Agreement Explaining and Supplementing Article VII of Treaty of Triple Alliance of 1887, Dec. 
15, 1909, Aust.-Hung.-Italy, 2 HURST, supra note 17, at 812, dealt with Balkan issues. Fifth 
Treaty of Triple Alliance, Dec. 5, 1912,217 Consol. T.S. 311, renewed the alliance for the last 
time. The 1882 treaty's operative terms, arts. 1-5, remained the same throughout. 
52. E.g., Secret Protocol, Nov. 15, 1818, 69 Consol. T.S. 369, among the victors of the 
Napoleonic wars, had a Military Protocol, id. 374, and was signed the same day as the published 
treaty; Protocol of Conference, supra note 30, admitted France to the Concert of Europe. See also 
supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS art. 18 
required that League Members' future treaties be registered with the League Secretariat and be 
published by it. No treaty would be binding until registered. This superseded terms like Treaty of 
Alliance, May 20, 1882, art. 6, 160 Consol. T.S. at 241, and State practice. "Open covenants of 
peace openly arrived at" had been the first of President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. 
Covenant Members soon ignored art. 18. FERRELL, supra note 38, at 54-61. U.N. CHARTER art. 
102 admonishes Members to submit their treaties for registration; a consequence for nonfiling is 
that a treaty cannot be invoked before a UN organ. See also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 
610-14; SIMMA. supra note 1, at 1103-16. Security agreements are often not published. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 312 r.n.s 
(1987) (RESTATEMENT (THIRD)). 
53 . TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 264. 
54. Romania had to aid Austria-Hungary only if she were attacked in territory of States 
bordering Romania. Treaty of Alliance, Oct. 30, 1883, Aus.-Hung.-Rom., arts. 2-3, 162 Consol. 
T.S. 488, 491. 
55. Germany accepted the treaty verbatim; Italy required consultation before action. 
Treaty Providing for Accession of Germany, Oct. 30, 1883, 162 id. 487,493; Treaty Providing for 
Accession of Italy, May 15, 1888, 171 id. 61. Treaty of Alliance, July 13/25, 1892, 
Aus.-Hung.-Rom., 177 id. 273, renewed the relationship; Germany and Italy acceded. Treaty 
Providing for Accession of Germany to the Alliance, Nov. 11/12, 1892, 178 id. 17; Treaty 
Providing for Accession ofltaly to the Alliance, Nov. 28, 1892, id. 39. Protocol, Sept. 30, 1896, 
183 id. 379, extended the alliance to 1902. Germany and Italy acceded. Accession of Germany, 
May 7,1899, id. 383; Accession ofltaly,June 5,1899, id. 389. The relationship was extended by 
Third Treaty Renewing Alliances of1892 and 1896, Apr. 4/17, 1902, Aust.-Hung.-Rom., 191 id. 
117; Treaty Providing for Accession of Germany to the Alliance, July 12/25, 1902, 2 HURST, 
supra note 17, at 729; Treaty Providing for Accession ofItaly to the Alliance, Dec. 12, 1902, 
Aust.-Hung.-Italy, id. 730; and by Treaty Renewing the Alliances of 1892, 1896, and 1903, Feb. 
5,1913,217 Consol. T.S. 384; Treaty Providing for Accession of Germany to the Alliance, Feb. 
13/26, id. 390; Treaty Providing for Accession ofItaly, Mar. 5, 1913, Aust.-Hung.-Italy, id. 393. 
56. Treaty of Alliance, supra note 51; see also supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
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57. Note of Russian Ambassador to France M. de Mohrenheim to French Foreign Minister 
M. Ribot, Aug. 15/27, 1891, annexing Letter of Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Nikolai Giers to 
de Mohrenheim, Aug. 9/21, 1891; Note of Ribot to de Mohrenheim, Aug. 27, 1891,2 Hurst, 
supra note 17, at 662-65. 
58. Draft of Military Convention, 1892, Fr.-Russ., id. 668, approved by Note of Giers to 
French Ambassador to Russia M. de Montbello, Dec. 15/27, 1893, id. 669. For diplomatic history 
analysis, see 1 WILLIAM L. LANGER, THE DIPLOMACY OF IMPERIALISM 1890--1912 chs. 1-2 
(1935); TAYLOR, supra note 17, ch. 15. 
59. PALMER, supra note 15, at 180. 
60. Id. 203; TAYLOR, supra note 17, ch. 18, analyzing Declaration Respecting Egypt and 
Morocco, Apr. 8, 1904, Fr.-Gr. Brit., 195 Consol. T.S. 198; Convention Respecting 
Newfoundland and West and Central Africa, Apr. 8, 1904, Fr.-Gr. Brit., id. 205. See also 
KAGAN, supra note 20, at 177-78. 
61. PALMER, supra note 15, at 211; TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 427-46, analyzing 
Convention Relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, Aug. 31, 1907, Gr. Brit.-Russ., 204 
Consol. T.S. 404. 
62. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 511. Only after the Great War began did Britain, France, 
and Russia sign the Pact of London, Sept. 5,1914,220 Consol. T.S. 330, pledging to continue 
the conflict until a satisfactory peace could be obtained. PALMER, supra note 15, at 232. 
63. KAGAN, supra note 20, at 150--51; PALMER, supra note 15, at 209. DON COOK, 
FORGING THE ALLIANCE 33 (1989) claims Britain's first peacetime defensive alliance was 
Treaty of Dunkirk, Mar. 4,1947, Fr.-U.K., 9 U.N.T.S. 187. However, the United Kingdom in 
effect allied with other States in Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, supra note 18, to enforC'e the 
Congress of Vienna system, the Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14, 1937, 181 L.N.T.S. 135, and 
Arrangement Supplementary to the Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 17, 1937, id. 149, and with 
Poland just before World War II. See supra notes 14-22; infra notes 138-43, 153,224-31,262 
and accompanying text. \Vhile Cook's statement is technically correct, the effect of these 
treaties was a defense alliance in each case. 
64. Treaty of Alliance, Mar. 30,1904, Bulg.-Serb., arts. 2-4, 2 HURST, supra note 17, at 
752. 
65. Treaty of Amity and Alliance, Feb. 29/Mar. 13, 1912, Bulg.-Serb., 215 Consol. T.S. 
390; Military Convention, Bulg.-Serb., Apr. 29/May 11, 1912, 2 HURST, supra note 17, at 822. 
An Alliance, Sept. 12/0ct. 6, 1912, Monteneg.-Serb., id. 828, included a decision in the Political 
Convention, art. 4, id. at 829, to go to war with Turkey. Military Convention, arts. 1-2, id., 
provided for strategic defense in war with Austria-Hungary and strategic offense in war with 
Turkey. 
66. Treaty of Defensive Alliance, May 16/29, 1912, Bulg.-Gr., art. 1,216 Consol. T.S. 179. 
See also Military Convention, Sept. 12, 1912, Bulg.-Gr., 2 HURST, supra note 17, at 830. 
67. Treaty of Alliance, May 19IJune 1, 1913, Gr.-Serb., art. 1, 218 Consol. T.S. 166, 167; 
Military Convention, May 19IJune 1, 1913, id. 170; see also Protocol Concerning Conclusion of 
Treaty of Alliance, Apr. 22/May 5,1913, id. 117. The Second Balkan War ended with Treaty of 
Peace, May 30, 1913, id. 159; Treaty of Peace, July 28/Aug. 10, 1913, id. 322. 
68. See supra notes 60--63 and accompanying text. 
69. Agreement Respecting Rights in EastemAsia and India, Gr. Brit.-Japan, July 13,1911, 
arts. 1-3,5, 214 Consol. T.S. 107-08; see also 2 LANGER, DIPLOMACY, supra note 58, ch. 23. 
70. KAGAN, supra note 20, at 128-29; but see TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 527-28. 
71. Hague III, supra note 38, arts. 1, 3, 36 Stat. at 2251; see also supra note 38 and 
accompanying text. 
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72. See generally PALMER, supra note 15, at 226-30; TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 520-30; 
BARBARA TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST 91-157 {1962}. 
73. TAYLOR, supra note 17, at 527-28. 
74. Pact of Paris, supra note 11, arts. 1-2. see also infra notes 111-27 and accompanying 
text. 
75. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. 
76. Hague II, supra note 39, art. 1,36 Stat. at2251; Hague III, supra note 38, arts. 1,3, id. at 
2271. 
77. See supra notes 19, 21, 25,32,36,43,51,54-55,57, 69 and accompanying text. 
78. See supra notes 21-22, 24-33, 36, 46, 57-61, 64, 69 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text. 
80. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
81. See infra notes 165-277 for analysis of self-defense in the Charter era. 
82. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, modified by 
Protocol on Accession of Greece and Turkey, Oct. 17,1951,3 U.S.T. 43,126 U.N.T.S. 350; 
Protocol on Accession of Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 5707, 243 
U.N.T.S. 308; Protocol on Accession of Spain, Dec. 10, 1981,34 U.S.T. 3510, analyzed infra 
notes 229, 232-34 and accompanying text. In 1997, agreements were signed to admit Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland to North Atlantic Treaty membership, with perhaps Romania 
and Slovenia to follow in a second round. The protocol is before the U.S. Senate for advice and 
consent. Predictably, the Department of State has promoted the expansion; others are critical of 
it. See generally U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, NATO Expansion: Beginning the 
Process of Advice and Consent: Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 8 U.S. 
Dep't St. Dispatch 1 {Oct. 1997} {favoring expansion}; Albright, NATO E"pansion: A Shared 
and Sensible Investment: Statement Before the Senate Appropriations Committee, id. 12 (Nov. 1997) 
(same); MANDELBAUM, supra note 20, at 45-65, 156, 164, 173-74 {opposing expansion}; Amos 
Perlmutter & Ted Galen Carpenter, NATO'S Expensive Trip East, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 2 Oan.-Feb. 
1998) (same). On Mar. 3,1998, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to recommend 
admitting Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to NATO. Steven Erlanger, Key Senate Panel 
Passes Resolution to Broaden NATO, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998, at Al. 
83. See infra notes 255-63 and accompanying text. 
84. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
85. E.g., supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
86. Cf. I.C.]. STATUTE, art. 38(1); RESTATEMENT {THIRD}, supra note 52, §§ 102-03. 
87. See F. P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ch. 4 (1952) for analysis 
of drafting of the Covenant; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
88. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969 art. 29, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
339 (Vienna Convention), (restating customary rule that unless a different intention appears 
from a treaty or is otherwise established, a treaty binds a party as to all its territory); IAN 
SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 89-92 (2d ed. 1984); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 322 & r.n. 2 (noting colonial empires' practice to 
specify territorial application). 
89. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS art. 1 provided that original Members were 
States signatory to Treaty of Versailles, supra note 10, of which the Covenant was Part I, and 
other States named in the Covenant Annex, e.g., countries like the Netherlands, were neutral 
during the war. Other States, Dominions, or colonies could join if the Assembly approved. See 
also WALTERS, supra r'Jte 87, at 43-44. For the Assembly's function, see infra notes 91,94 and 
accompanying text. The United States signed the Treaty of Versailles, supra, but the Senate 
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never gave advice and consent. See WALTERS, supra, ch. 6; supra note 10 and accompanying 
text. 
90. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS arts. 4(1), 10. For President Woodrow 
\Xfilson, Article 10 was the Covenant's key provision. KAGAN, supra note 20, at 299; WALTERS, 
supra note 87, at 48-49. The United States was also mentioned but never joined the League. See 
supra notes 10, 89 and accompanying text. 
91. Id., arts. 3, 6,11;seealso U.N. CHARTER arts. 97-101; GoODruCHET AL.,supranote5, 
ch. 15; WALTERS, supra note 87, at 44-47, 49. 
92. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS arts. 12-13, 15; see also WALTERS, supra 
note 87, at 49-53. 
93. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS arts. 16(1)-16(2); see also WALTERS, supra 
note 87, at 53. 
94. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS arts. 18-19, countering treaty terms of the 
previous era, which often enjoined secrecy on parties; see also WALTERS, supra note 87, at 54-55; 
supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
95. Compare U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(1), 2(4), with COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF 
NATIONS arts. 10-11. 
96. Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 31(1) (treaty interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with ordinary meaning given terms in their context and in light of its object and 
purpose); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 325(1); Eduardo Jimenez de 
Arechaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century, 159 R.C.A.D.I. 1,42-48 (1978). 
97. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 10, arts. 42-44. 
98. Agreement Providing for Assistance to France in Event of Unprovoked Aggression by 
Germany, June 28,1919, Fr.-U.S., arts. 1-2, 112 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 216-17,13 AM.J. INT'LL. 
411-13 (Supp. 1919); Agreement for Assistance to France in Event of Unprovoked Aggression 
by Germany, June 28, 1919, Fr.-Gr. Brit., arts. 1-2, id. 213-14, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 414-15 (Supp. 
1919), signed the same day as Treaty of Versailles, supra note 10. 
99. See supra notes 10,89-90 and accompanying text. 
100. KAGAN, supra note 20, at 297-98; George A. Finch, A Pact of Non-Aggression, 27 AM. 
J. INT'LL. 525, 526 (1933). COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS art. 21, also provided that 
nothing in the Covenant would be deemed to affect "validity of international agreements, such 
as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the 
maintenance of peace." Article 21 was inserted to try to assure U.S. Senate passage of the Treaty 
of Versailles, supra note 10. President Woodrow Wilson and British Prime Minister David Lloyd 
George agreed, in exchange, to the treaties, supra note 98, that pledged aid to France if Germany 
attacked her again. Latin American States were not happy with the Monroe Doctrine reference. 
WALTERS, supra note 87, at 55-56. 
101. Military Convention, Feb. 21, 1921, Fr.-Pol., art. I, in J.A.S. GRENVILLE, THE MAJOR 
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 1914-15, at 116 (1987) (1 GRENVILLE); Treaty of Alliance, Jan. 21, 
1924, Czech.-Fr., arts. 1-2, id. 117; see also Political Agreement, Feb. 19, 1921, Fr.-Pol., id. 116. 
These agreements were modified by revised alliances (1925) negotiated in connection with 
Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, Oct. 16, 1925,54 L.N.T.S. 289 (Locarno Treaty), analyzed infra at 
notes 106-08 and accompanying text. See also KAGAN, supra note 20, at 390. 
102. E.g., Alliance, Aug. 14,1920, Czech.-Yugo., art. 1, 6 L.N.T.S. 209, 211; Alliance, Apr. 
23, 1921, Czech.-Rom., art. I, 13 id. 231, 233; Defensive Alliance, June 7, 1921, Rom.-Yugo., 
art. I, 54 id. 257, 259 (collective self-defense from "unprovoked attack"; also providing for 
consultation); THEODORE I. GESHKOFF, BALKAN UNION: A ROAD TO PEACE IN 
SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE 62-63 (1940) (Entente's weakness was that it did not provide for 
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defense to unprovoked attack by a great power); 1 GRENVILLE, supra note 101, (Entente 
designed to maintain the Treaties ofNeuilly and Trianon, supra note 10.). France and Italy also 
negotiated treaties with Entente States. Id. 114-15; L.S. STAVRIANOS, BALKAN FEDERATION 
227 (1964). 
103. See 12 LEAGUE OF NATIONS 0.J.147-49 (1931), adopting Third Committee, General 
Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War: Report to the Assembly, League of Nations 
Doc. A.77.1931.IX (1931), annex. 24, id. 237-38; General Convention to Improve the Means of 
Preventing War, League of Nations Doc. A.78.1931.IX (1931), Annex 24(a), id. 241; Third 
Committee, Draft Report to the Assembly, League of Nations Doc. A.III.17.1931.IX (1931), 
Annex 3, 12 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 59-60 (1931); and First Committee 
Minutes, 12 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. Spec. Supp. 94, at 21-41, 73-74 (1931), adopting 
Amendment of the Covenant of the League of Nations in Order to Bring It into Harmony with the Pact 
of Paris, Annex 18, id. 145, 146. See also Observations Submitted by Governments, League of 
Nations Doc. A.11.1931.V (1931), id. 75; Precis of the Observations Submitted by the Governments 
Since the Assembly of 1930, id. 92; ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 37. 
104. KAGAN, supra note 20, at 307; WALTERS, supra note 87, at 223-27,267-76,283-85, 
288,291,362,384,710. 
105. See infra notes 111-26, 202-10 and accompanying text. 
106. LocarnoTreaty, supra note 101, art. 2, 54 L.N.T.S. at 293. See also ALEXANDROV, supra 
note 1, at 44-47; BOWEIT, supra note 1, at 127-29; KAGAN, supra note 20, at 308-15, 335, 
355-57,378. WALTERS, supra note 87, at 285-94; id. ch. 54 (German denunciation of Locamo, 
1936); C.G. Fenwick, The Progress of Cooperative Defense, 24 AM. J. INTL L. 118, 120 (1930) 
(France concluded guaranty treaties "of the old type" with Czechoslovakia and Poland besides 
signing Locarno Treaties); Fenwick, The Legal Significance of the Lacarno Agreements, 20 id. 108 
(1926); Finch, supra note 100, at 727-28 (failure of multilateral 1924 Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance); Quincy Wright, The Munich Settlement and International Law, 33 AM. J. INTL L 12, 
18 (1939) (German denunciation of Locarno). 
107. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 45. 
108. Locarno Treaty, supra note 101, art. 1 (italics in original). 
109. A party claiming a violation had to bring the case to the League. Id., art. 4. 
110. Id., art. 9, imposed no obligations on the British Dominions or India unless they 
assented. However, the Treaty said nothing about the then-extensive Belgian, French, or Italian 
possessions or British colonies. Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 29; see also supra note 
88 and accompanying text. See WALTERS, supra note 87, ch. 24, for analysis of the Locarno 
treaties in the context of the Covenant. Germany ended the arrangement in 1936 by denouncing 
the Treaty. WALTERS, supra, ch. 54; Wright, The Munich, supra note 106. 
111. Pact of Paris, supra note 11, arts. 1-2. See generally FERRELL, supra note 38, at 66-191; 
DAVID HUNTER MILLER, THE PEACE PACf OF PARIS: A STUDY OF THE BRIAND-KELLOGG 
TREATY 7-120 (1928) for negotiating history. Fr~nch Foreign Minister Anstide Briand's reading 
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., 1976) may 
have inspired the Pact. FERRELL, supra at 66. 
112. U.N. CHARTER art. 103. See also Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 30; 
REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 102 cmt. h; § 323 cmt. b; SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 
94-98, 184-85. 
113. DEPT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 430-31 (1997) (TIF). 
114. See generally Symposium, State Succession in the Former Soviet Union and in Eastern 
Europe, 33 VA. J. INTL L. 253 (1993); Walker, Integration and Disintegration, supra note 42. 
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115. Agreement for Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European 
A.xis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 2, 59 Stat. 1544-45, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, 282, annexing Charter of 
International Military Tribunal, art. 6, id. 1546, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 286-88 (Nuremberg 
Charter). 
116. United'States v. Goring, 1 Tr. Maj. War Crim. Before Int'l Mil. Trib. 171,208,218-22 
(1947), 41 AM. J. INTL 1. 172, 216 (1947) (Nuremberg Judgment); see also McDOUGAL & 
FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 531,533. 
117. G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A!236, at 1144 (1946). International 
Law Commission, Fonnulation of the Nuremberg Principles, 19502 Y.B. INTL 1. COMM'N 193, 195 
reiterated principles of the Pact, the Judgment and the Resolution. For further analysis of the war 
crimes trials and the 1946 Assembly resolution, see infra notes 202-10 and accompanying text. 2 
OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 52fh, at 183, says resort to war is lawful as between Pact parties and 
non'parties, and presumably a fortiori between two States that are not Pact parties. However, 
principles of treaty succession, supra note 114 and accompanying text, and acceptance of Pact 
principles as a general customary norm make this claim dubious today. See supra notes 115-16, 
infra notes 165, 203-06, and accompanying text. 
118. Multilateral Treaty for Renunciation of War: Identic Notes of the Government of the 
United States to the Governments of Australia et aI., June 23, 1928, 22 AM. J. INTL 1. 109 
(Supp. 1928). See also MILLER, supra note 111, at 80--98; WALTERS, supra note 87, at 385-86. 
119. The result was that the Pact applied to most of the Earth's territory. Cf. Vienna 
Convention, supra note 88, art. 29; supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
120. See 1928(1) FOR. RELS. U.S. 107-24 (1942); see also telegram of U.S. Secretary of State 
Frank B. Kellogg to Myron T. Herrick, U.S. Ambassador to France, June 20, 1928 in id. 90, 91. 
Secretary Kellogg had made nearly verbatim, but unofficial, comments on April 23, 1928, at the 
American Society of International Law annual meeting. Address of the Honorable Frank B. 
Kellogg, 1928 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INTL 1.141, 143. Other contemporaries analyzed the Pact in 
this context. See generally FERRELL, supra note 38, at 170--191; MILLER, supra note Ill, at 83-85, 
102, 104, 106, 109, 114, 123, 280; Edwin M. Borchard, The Multilateral Treaty for the 
Renunciation of War, 23 AM.J. INTL 1.116 (1929); Henry M. Stimson, The Pact of Paris: Three 
Years of Dellelopment, 11 FOREIGN AFF. i, v. (Special Supp. Oct. 1932). The international 
academic community, as well as the diplomats clearly understood the Pact and the self·defense 
reservation. See also Louis B. Sohn, The International Court ofjustice and the Scope of the Right of 
Self·Defense and the Duty of Non.Interllention, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF 
PERPLEXITY: EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE 869,872-75 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 
1988). 
121. FERRELL, supra note 38, at 193-200; 3 CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED BY THE UNITED STATES 1683 (1945); McDOUGAL & 
FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 141; MILLER, supra note 111, at 111; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note I, §§ 
52fh, 52g; see also ALEXANDROV, supra note I, at 58; but see Quincy Wright, The Interpretation of 
Multilateral Treaties, 23 AM. J. INTL 1. 94, 104, 106 (1929); Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of 
Paris, 27 id. 39, 43 (1933). The notes debate continued in the U.S. Senate. FERRELL, supra at 
246-52. 
122. Note of UK Ambassador Houghton to Secretary of State Kellogg, May 19, 1928, 
1928(1} FOR. RELS. U.S. 67 (1942). 
123. See ALEXANDROV,supra note 1, at 55-56; FERRELL, supra note 38, at 179-81; MILLER, 
supra note 111, at 68.69,117-18,121-22; WALTERS, supra note 87, at 386; Borchard, supra 
note 120, at 118. 
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124. Note of Soviet Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov to French 
Ambassador to Russia Herbette, Aug. 31, 1928, 1928(1) FOR. RELS. U.S. 170, 174 (1942). Four 
or five other countries objected to inclusion of any reservations, e.g., either the British or the U.S. 
reservations. See, e.g., Note of Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs H. AM to U.S. Charge' 
d'Affaires Winship, Sept. 3. 1928, id. 183. 184; note of Turkey's Minister for Foreign Affairs to 
U.S. Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, Sept. 6. 1928, id. 195. 196. BROWNLIE. USE OF FORCE. supra 
note I. at 244. says Afghanistan and Persia raised similar objections; MILLER, supra note Ill. at 
122. also mentions Hungary. Objections to reservations today would apply only to States raising 
them and the reserving State. Vienna Convention. supra note 88. arts. 19-23; Reservations to 
Convention on Prevention & Punishment of Crime of Genocide. 1951 I.C.J. 15 (Genocide 
Reservations Case); IAN BROWNLIE. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 608-11 
(4th ed. 1990); T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 27-36 (1974); LORD MCNAIR. 
THE LAW OF TREATIES 158-71 (2d ed. 1961); 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra 
note I. §§ 614-19; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52. § 313; SINCLAIR, supra note 88. at 
13.51-82 (Vienna Convention. supra. arts. 19-23. represent progressive development); D.W. 
Bowett, Reservations to Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 67. 88-90 
(1976); J.M. Ruda. Reservations to Treaties, 146 R.C.A.D.1. 95 (1975). 
125. See generally J.E.S. FAWCETT, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1963); States: British Commonwealth. 1 WHITEMAN, DIGEST § 30. 
126. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
127. U.S. Note of April 23. 1928. 1928(1) FOR. RELS. U.S. 34, 36-37 (1942); see also supra 
notes 118-21 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
129. Pact of Organisation of the Little Entente. Feb. 16. 1933. arts. 10-11. 139 L.N.T.S. 233. 
239. citing inter alia COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS; Lacarno Treaty, supra note 101; 
Pact of Paris, supra note 11; Alliance, Apr. 23. 1921. Czech-Rom .• supra note 101; Alliance. June 
7, 1921, Rom.-Yugo., supra note 101; Alliance. Aug. 31. 1922. Czech.-Yugo .• reprinted in 
NORMANJ. PADELFORD. PEACE IN THE BALKANS 183 (1935). 
130. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text. 
131. Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, Feb. 9,1934,153 L.N.T.S. 153; Protocol, Feb. 9, 1934. 
arts. 1, 3, id. 157. 
132. See 1 GRENVILLE, supra note 101, at 115; supra notes 101-02 and accompanying textj 
see also GESHKOFF, supra note 102, chs. 5-12; P ADELFORD, PEACE, supra note 129, chs. 1-4. for 
history of negotiations. 
133. Pan American Union, Apr. 14, 1890, Jan 29, 1902, Aug. 11, 1910, 1 Bevans 129,344, 
752; see also infra note 219 and accompanying text. 
134. Convention for Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace, Dec. 23, 
1936, preamble, 51 Stat. 15 (Peace Convention); see also Additional Protocol Relative to 
Non-intervention, Dec. 23, 1936, id. 41. 
135. Convention to Coordinate, Extend and Assure Fulfillment of Existing Treaties 
Between American States, Dec. 23, 1936, arts.1-7, 51 id. 116, 119-21, citing Treaty to Avoid 
and Prevent Conflicts Between the American States, May 23, 1923, 44 id. 2527 (Gondra 
Treaty); Pact of Paris. supra note 11; General Convention oflnter-American Conciliation. Jan. 
5. 1929.46 Stat. 2209; General Treaty ofInter-American Arbitration. Jan. 5. 1929.49 id. 3153; 
Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation. Oct. 10. 1933, id. 3363 (Saavedra Lamas Treaty); 
Peace Convention, supra note 135. The latter agreement also referred to the Pact of Paris, supra. 
136. TIF, supra note 113, at 414-15,430-31. 
137. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text. 
408 
George K. Walker 
138. Nyon Arrangement; Agreement Supplementary to the Nyon Arrangement, supra note 
63; see also C.jOHNCOLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE SEA § 472 (6thed.1967); 
NORMAN j. PADELFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND DIPLOMACY IN THE SPANISH CML 
STRIFE, ch. 2 (1939); L.F.E. Goldie, Commentary, in THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A 
COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS WITH COMMENTARIES 489 (Natalino 
Ronzitti ed., 1988) (COLLECTION). 
139. See generally PADELFORD, INTERNATIONAL, supra note 138, ch. 2, app. XV; WALTERS, 
supra note 87, at 721,725-26, for descriptions of attacks. 
140. Treaty for Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments, Apr. 22, 1930, art. 22,46 
Stat. 2858, 2881-82, 112 L.N.T.S. 65, 88; Proces-Verbal Relating to Rules of Submarine 
Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of 22 April 1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 173 
L.N.T.S. 353, 355-57; see also Edwin 1. Nwogugu, Commentary, in COLLECTION, supra note 138, 
at 353. 
141. Nyon Arrangement, supra note 63, 1111 2-3. 
142. Goldie, supra note 138, at 494. 
143. PADELFORD, INTERNATIONAL, supra note 138, at 49. 
144. International Law Association, Budapest Articles of Interpretation: Final Text, arts. 2-4, in 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AssOCIATION, REpORT OF THE 38TH CONFERENCE 66, 67 (1934), 
reprinredinRights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression, 33 AM.j. INT'L L. 819, 825 n.l (Supp. 
1939). 
145. Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression, 33 
AM. j. INT'L L. 819 (Supp. 1939). BOWETT, supra note 1, at 161, writing in 1958, said the Draft 
Convention's principles were de lege ferenda. Query whether he would have come to the same 
conclusion after the relatively full historical record of World War II had been available. 
146. George K. Walker, Maritime Neutrality in the Charter Era, 17 ANN. PROC. U. VA. 
CENTER FOR OCEANS L. & POL 'Y. 124, 142-46 (1993). See also ROBERT E. SHERWOOD, 
ROOSEVELT AND HOPKINS: AN INTIMATE HISTORY chs. 10, 12 (1950 rev. ed.) for a U.S. and 
diplomatic history perspective on Lend-Lease. 
147. 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS 
DURING WORLD WAR II: THE BATTLE OF THE ATI.ANTIC: SEPTEMBER 1939 - MAY 1943, at 
56-113 (1947). President Franklin D. Roosevelt chose the line on july 11, 1941, by ripping a map 
out of a National Geographic magazine and drawing a line for the U.S. Navy's policing area, which 
included seas east of Greenland and Iceland. SHERWOOD, supra note 146, ad08, 310-11. 
148. See generally SHERWOOD, supra note 146, ad08, 310-11, which may recount details 
of the UK-U.S. arrangement, which was probably informal in nature; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD), supra note 52, §§ 301 cmt. b &r.n. 4; 312 r.n. 5. 
149. See WALTERS, supra note 87, chs. 66-67. 
150. Treaty of Mutual Assistance, May 2,1935, Fr.-U.S.S.R., arts. 1-2, 167 L.N.T.S. 395, 
404; Treaty of Mutual Assistance, May 16, 1935, Czech.-U.S.S.R., arts. 1-2, 159 id. 347, 357; see 
also KAGAN supra note 20, at 390. 
151. Protocol of Mutual Assistance, May 2, 1935, Mong.-U.S.S.R., arts. 1-2, 140 Brit. & 
For. St. Pap. 666. 
152. Pact of Mutual Assistance, Sept. 28,1939, Est.-U.S.S.R., art. 1, 198 U.N.T.S. 223, 228; 
Pact of Mutual Assistance, Oct. 5, 1939, Lat.-U.S.S.R., art. 1, id. 381, 386. The USSR also 
negotiated a pact with Lithuania on Oct. 10, 1939. These agreements' real purpose was in other 
provisions, granting the USSR bases in these States. 1 GRENVILLE, supra note 101, at 182-83, 
201. 
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153. Agreement of Mutual Assistance, Aug. 25, 1939, Po1.-U.K., art. 2, 199 L.N.T.S. 57, 58. 
A Secret Protocol, Aug. 25, 1939, Po1.-U.K., arts. 1-2, 1 GRENVILLE, supra note 101, at 191, 
defined the Agreement's object as defense against Germany, included the Free City of Danzig 
within the meaning of contracting parties, and would include Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and the Netherlands once mutual assistance pacts with those States had been 
concluded. Protocol of Mutual AsSistance, Sept. 4, 1939, Fr.-Pol., art. 1, 1 Grenvtlle, supra at 
192, employed similar language to the Poland-U.K. agreement but did not append a secret 
protocol, insofar as research reveals. See also 1 WINSTON S. CHuRCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD 
WAR.397 (1948); 1 GRENVILLE, supra at 178-79; WALTERS, supra note 87, at 798-99. 
154. Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Oct. 15, 1939, Fr.-Turk.-U.K., arts. 1-7,200 L.N.T.S. 
167,169-71; see also 1 CHURCHILL, supra note 153, at551, 703 (Turkey's fear of Soviet attack); 1 
GRENVILLE, supra note 101, at 179- 80. 
155 . Treaty of Alliance in War Against Hiderite Germany and Her Associates in Europe and 
of Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter, May 26,1942, U.K.-U.S.S.R., arts. 3-4, 204 
L.N.T.S. 353, 356. Seealso Agreement Providing for Joint Action in War Against Germany, July 
12,1941, U.K.-U.S.S.R., id. 277; 4 CHURCHILL, supra note 153, at335-36 (1950); 1 GRENVILLE, 
supra note 101, at 204-06. 
156. Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Dec. 10, 1944, Fr.-U.S.S.R., arts. 1,3-4, 149 
Brit. & For. St. Pap. 632, 633-34. See also Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and 
Post-War Cooperation, Dec. 12, 1943, Czech-U.S.S.R., art. 3, 145 id. 238, 239, which can only 
be interpreted as applying to reactive measures, since it spoke of a party's being in a future war 
with Germany. Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, China-U.S.S.R., art. 3, 1 GRENVILLE, supra at 
237, had similar terms for future war with Japan. See also id. 226. Agreement, July 30, 1941, 
Pol.-U.S.S.R., art. 3, 144 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 869, could only be regarded as a defensive alliance; 
both States were then at war with Germany. See also 1 GRENVILLE, supra at 207,209. 
157. Treaty of Alliance, Jan. 29, 1942, art. 3(i}, 36 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 175, 176 (1942), 
144 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 1017, 1018; see also 1 GRENVILLE, supra note 101, at 204. 
158. Declaration of Panama, supra note 13, "ill. 
159. Belligerents refused to recognize the zone. Panama Minister for Foreign Affairs Narciso 
Garay cable to U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Jan. 26, 1940, enclosing Statement on 
Behalf of the British Government, Statement on Behalf of the French Government, 1940(1) 
FoR. RELS. U.S. 689, 690, 693 (1959); Panama Ambassador Jorge E. Boyd cable to Secretary of 
State Hull, Feb. 16, 1940, enclosing note of German Charge d'Affaires Von Winter to Panama 
Minister for Foreign Affairs Garay, Feb. 14, 1940, id. 696. Situation III: Contiguous Zones, 
Airplanes, and Neutrality, in NAVAL WAR. C., INT'L L. SITUATIONS 1939, at 59, 80 (1940) 
concluded that the Declaration, supra note 136, was not a part of international law. See also 1 
GRENVILLE, supra note 101, at 246-47; ROBERT W. TuCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND 
NEUTRAUTY AT SEA 224-26 (50 Naval War C. Int'l L. Stud., 1957). 
160. Agreement Relating to Defense of Greenland, Apr. 7-9,1941, Den.-D.S., art. 1,55 
Stat. 1245, 1246, 204 L.N.T.S.135, 137, terminated by Agreement, Apr. 27, 1941, Den.-U.S., 2 
U.S.T. 1485; see also Agreement Relating to Defense of Greenland, NAVAL WAR C., INT'L L. 
DOCUMENTS 1940, at 202-13 (1942). 
161. Rights and Duties of States, 5 WHITEMAN, DIGEST § 25, at 997, referring to Act of 
Havana, July 30, 1940,54 Stat. 2491, cited in Agreement Relating to Defense of Greenland, 
supra note 160, art. 1. See also 1 GRENVILLE, supra note 101, at 247. 
162. Act of Havana, supra note 161, at 2502, 2504, referring to Convention Respecting 
Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas, July 30, 
1940, 56 id. 1273. The Convention, a permanent treaty, superseded the Act, an executive 
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agreement in U.S. practice but a treaty for other States, in part; the Convention did not assert 
self.defense rights stated in the Act. It must be presumed that these provisions remained in 
effect, being cited by Agreement Relating to Defense of Greenland, supra note 160, art. 1. See 
supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text. 
163. Agreement Respecting Defense of Iceland by United States Forces, July 1, 1941, 55 
Stat. 1547, 1549-50, terminated by Exchange of Notes, Oct. 7, 1946,61 id. 2426; see also Defense 
of Iceland by United States Forces, in NAVAL WAR C., INT'L L. DOCUMENTS 1940, at 245-50 
(1942). 
164. McHugh, supra note 1, at 65. 
165. See generally GOODRICH ET AL, supra note 5, at 1-12; RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER (1958); SIMMA, supra note 1, at 2-12. 
166. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 115; see also supra notes 115-16 and infra notes 202-10 
and accompanying text. 
167. See generally ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 77-79; GOODRICH ET AL, supra note 5, at 
44,342-43; MCCORMACK, supra note 1, at 153-57, 167-68; RUSSELL, supra note 165, at 456, 
688-712. 
168. Inter·American Reciprocal Assistance and Solidarity (Act of Chapultepec), Mar. 8, 
1945, Pts. 1(3), 1(4), II-III, 60 Stat. 1831, 1839-40; see also Manuel S. Canyes, The 
Inter·American System and the Conference ofChapultepec, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 504 (1945); JosefL. 
Kunz, The Inter.Americall System and the United Nations Organization, id. 758. The Act was 
superseded by Inter·American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947 (Rio Treaty), 62 
Stat. 1681, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 and the end of World War II; see also infra notes 218-23 and 
accompanying text. 
169. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text. 
170. See generally ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 80.93; BOWEfT, supra note 1, at 182-83; 
BRO\Y/NLIE, USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 270-71; GoODRICH ET AL, supra note 5, at 342-44; 
RUSSELL, supra note 165, at 690-99; STOETZER, supra note 17, at 28; Kunz, Inter.American 
System, supra note 168. 
171. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 95; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 52aa, at 155; 
Robert W. Tucker, The Interpretation of War under Present International Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11, 29 
(1951). 
172. See supra notes 37-164 and accompanying text. 
173. J.B. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 417 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); 
BRO\Y/NLIE, USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at 271-72; GOODRICH ET AL, supra note 5, at 344; 
JESSUP, supra note 1, at 166-68; HANs KELSEN, RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAw OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 913-14 (1961); D.W. Bowett, Collective Self·Defense under the Charter of the United 
Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'LL.130, 131 (1955); Arthur L. Goodhart, The North Atlantic Treaty 
of 1949, 79 R.CAD.I. 187, 192 (1951). 
174. Nicaragua Case, supra note 1, at 94. See also id. at 152-53 (sep. opin of Singh, Pres.); 
Sohn, supra note 120, at 871. 
175. E.g., self·defense principles to jUstify anti·terrorism and drug trafficking suppression. 
Geoffrey M. Levitt, Intervention to Combat Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, in LAW AND FORCE, 
supra note 1, at 224. Kolosov, supra note 1, at 234, proposed a treaty to define self·defense. 
176. Cf. I.C.J. STATUTE, art. 38(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, §§ 102-03, 
emphasize that treaty law, e.g., the Charter, must be balanced against customary norms, and that 
custom can develop contrary to treaty.based law and can outweigh treaty law. U.N. CHARTER 
art. 103 only applies to treaties inconsistent with the Charter. Moreover,jus cogens norms may 
outweigh custom or treaties. If a jus cogens norm develops on a track different from a 
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Charter-based nonn or a customary nonn based on the Charter, jus cogens trumps either. On the 
other hand, if a Charter-based nonn, whether a rule from the Charter as treaty or a parallel 
customary rule, isjus cogens, it trumps other standards. Nicaragua Case, supra note 1, at 100, held 
nonns under U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4} approached jus cogens status, superseding contrary 
custom. At least one commentator has argued that the right to self-defense as a jus cogens nonn 
may be presumed. Carin Kahgan,Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, 3 ILSAJ. INT'L 
& COMPo L. 767, 827 (1997). Jus cogens' scope varies widely among commentators. See also 
Vienna Convention, supra note 88, arts. 5, 30(1}, 53, 64; ELIAS, supra note 124, at 177-87; 1 
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 1, §§ 2, 642, 653; SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 
17-18,85-87,94-95, 160, 184-85,218-26,246; REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, §§ 102 r.n.6, 
323 cmt. b, 331(2}, 338(2}; GRlGORlI 1. TuNKlN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 98 
(William E. Butler trans., 1974); Levan Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in Contemporary 
Law, In R.C.A.D.I. 219, 262-63 (1981); Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 96, at 64-69; John 
N. Hazard, Soviet Tactics in International Lawmaking, 7 DENV. J. INTL L. & POL'Y 9,25-29 
(1977); Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept ofjus Cogens, As Illustrated by the War in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INTL L. 1 (1995); supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
177. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 101-02, quoting Waldock, Regulation, supra note 1, at 
504, referring to U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51 (Chapter VII, Action with Respect to Threats to 
the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression), 52-54 (Regional Arrangements) 
(italics in original). 
178. BOWETT, supra note 1, at 131; see also ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 102. 
179. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 102; GoODRICHET AL, supra note 5, at 179; Waldock, 
Regulation, supra note 1, at 504. 
180. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 102, citing GOODRICH ET AL, supra note 5, at 179; 
KELSEN, LAw OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 4, at 796; Waldock, Regulation, supra note 
1, at 504. 
181. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 52aa, at 155-56; Bowett, Collective Self-Defence, supra 
note 173, at 136-40, 159-60. 
182. BOWETT, supra note 1, at 216-20; JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 245 (1959 rev.); Bowett, Collective Self-Defence, supra note 173, at 
139-40. 
183. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 102; GOODRICH Ef AL, supra note 5, at 348; KELSEN, 
LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 4, at 792; McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, 
at 250. J.G. STARKE, THE ANzus TREATY ALLIANCE 98-99 (1965) says Security Treaty, Sept. 
1, 1951, pmbl., 3 U.S.T. 3420, 3422, 131 U.N.T.S. 83, 84 (ANZUS Pact) memorialized infonnal 
arrangements after World War II and during the Korean War. See also TREVOR R. REESE, 
AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS, chs. 2, 4 (1969); W. DAVID MCINTYRE, BACKGROUNDTOTHEANZUSPACT, chs. 
9-10 (1995); infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text. A theory of informal collective 
self-defense arrangements also supports, e.g., actions of states assisting South Korea or 
maintaining naval forces between Taiwan and the China mainland during the Korean War, or 
countries supporting the United Kingdom during the FalklandslMalvinas War. See generally 
George K. Walker, State Practice Since World War II: 1945-1990, in THE LAW OF NAVAL 
WARFARE: TARGETING ENEMY MERCHANT SHIPPING 121, 125-30, 153-55 (65 Naval War C. 
Int'l L. Stud., Richard J. Grunawalt ed. 1993). 
184. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 103; GoODRICH ET AL, supra note 5, at 348. 
185. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 103; Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of Military 
Intervention by Invitation of the Government, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INTL L. 189, 218-21 (1985); Waldock, 
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Regulation, supra note 1, at 505. The right to assist another State is not an inherent right. 
KELSEN, LAw OF TIiE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 4, at 797. This is consistent with one view 
of the law of treaties, which declares that treaty parties cannot agree to confer a benefit (here, 
aiding a target Stllte) without beneficiary consent. REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 
324(3). Under this view, if an assisting State and a target State are UN Members, the target state 
has a potential benefit if assisted under U.N. CHARTER art. 51, a treaty provision; the target must 
request help. Vienna Convention, supra note 88, art. 36(1), is the same as the REsTATEMENT 
view but adds that unless a treaty provides otherwise, assent is presumed. Under this approach, 
an assisting State could assume that a benefit-help against an attacking State-is presumed 
under the Article 51 collective self-defense. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 
I. § 627. at 1264, says the Charter is an exception to the rule that a treaty (the Charter) cannot 
impose benefits on a Sate not party, i.e., a State that is not a UN Member. However, this does not 
affect the Article 51 request rule among UN Members. Requiring a request is the safer course; 
otherwise an assisting State may be accused of violating U.N. CHARTER art. 2. See also 1 
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, § 626; SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 98-106. 
186. See generally, e.g., supra note 1 for different views of the United States, which has an 
anticipatory self-defense policy and the USSR, which held a restrictive view. 
187. See, e.g., supra note 3; commentators disagree on the legality of the 1981 Israeli raid on 
the Iraq reactor. Compare, e.g., ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 159-65. with McCORMACK, 
supra note 1, at 285-302. 
188. Unless a treaty provides otherwise, it remains in effect a year after a notice of 
denunciation is filed. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 88, arts. 56-58; International 
Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly, U.N. Doc. N6309/Rev. 1, reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 171, 250-51 
1974 (ILC Rep.); BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, at 617; McNAIR, supra note 124. chs. 
32-33; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, § 647; REsTATEMENT (THIRD), 
supra note 52, §§ 332-33; SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 183-88. 
189. Claim of a material breach. without notice and other procedures, does not entitle a 
claimant to say a treaty is terminated. See ILC Rep., supra note 188, at 253-55. Claims of breach 
must go to the heart of an agreement. Special rules apply to multilateral treaties. Vienna 
Convention, supra note 88, art. 60; Advisory Opinion on Namibia, 1971 I.e.]. 16, 46-47; 
Jurisdiction ofICAO Council (India v. Pak.). 1972 I.C.J. 46, 67; BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra 
note 124. at 618-19; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, § 649; 
REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 335; SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 20, 166, 188-90. 
190. E.g., a State with a strong anticipatory self-defense policy assisting a reactive 
self-defense policy State insisting on reactive self-defense aid might claim that reactive aid only 
would endanger its forces, configured for anticipatory self-defense, and that this amounts to a 
fundamental change of circumstances because its self-defense preparations are keyed to use in an 
anticipatory mode. For further analysis of fundamental change of circumstances, see Vienna 
Convention, supra note 88, art. 62; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ice. v. U.K.), 1973 I.e.J. 3, 18; 
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, at 620-21; ARlE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF 
TREATY TERMINATION, ch. 1 (1975); ELIAS, supra note 124, at 119-28; ILC Rep., supra note 
188. at 257-58; 1 OPPENHIEM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 1, § 651; REsTATEMENT 
(THIRD), supra note 52, § 336; SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 20, 192-96; Gyorgy Haraszti, Treaties 
and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 146 R.C.A.D.I. 1 (1975); Oliver J. Lissitzyn, 
Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 895 (1967). 
191. E.g., a State with a strong anticipatory self-defense policy assisting a reactive 
self-defense policy State that insists on reactive self-defense aid might claim that reactive 
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self-defense aid would endanger its forces, configured for anticipatory self-defense, and that 
because this is the only way that these forces can operate, perfonnance under the agreement is 
impossible. For further analysis of impossibility of perfonnance, see Vienna Convention, supra 
note 88, art. 61; ELIAS, supra note 124, at 128-30; ILC Rep., supra note 188, at 255-56; 1 
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, § 650; SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 190-92. 
192. See, e.g., supra notes 3, 187 for differing views of commentators on the validity of claims 
of anticipatory self-defense claims for specific operations. 
193. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. 
194. See Vienna Convention, supra note 88, arts. 19-23; supra note 124. 
195. This is like the rule of regression to common denominator when States rely on custom 
and there are objectors. See generally BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, at 10; 1 
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, § 10, at 29; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra 
note 52, § 102 cmts. b, d; Michael Akehurst, Custom As a Source of Law, 47 BRITY.B. INT'L L. 1, 
23-27 (1974); C.H.M. Waldock, General Course on Public International Law, 106 R.C.A.D.I. 1, 
49-53 (1962); but see Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 A11. J. INT'L L. 529, 
538-41 (1993) (existence of persistent objector rule open to serious doubt). J. ASHLEY ROACH & 
ROBERT W. SMITH's, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS (2d ed. 
1996), an exhaustive study of objections to law of the sea claims indicates that the persistent 
objector rule is alive and well, at least for law of the sea issues. Undoubtedly, there are thousands 
of protests filed annually on many issues in the chancelleries, few if any of which are published. It 
cannot, therefore, be assumed, as some commentators do, that the rule of the persistent objector 
is in disuetude. 
196. Cf. BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, at 611; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra 
note 52, § 313 cmt. b. 
197. See, e.g., Genocide Reservations Case, supra note 124, 1951 I.e.]. at 32 (Guerrero, Vice 
Pres.; Hsu Mo, McNair, Read, JJ., dissenting); BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, at 609; 
MCNAIR,supranote 124, at 169; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 1, § 616, at 
1245; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 313 r.n.l; SINCLAIR, supra note 88, at 54-55. 
198. See infra notes 216-63 and accompanying text. 
199. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. Although Iceland claims of 
fundamental change in law were rejected, Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 164, at 16-21, did 
not discount the possibility that a large enough change in law could be grounds for a change of 
circumstances claim. 
200. Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277; Right of Passage Over Indian Terr. 
(Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6; BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, at 9-10; 1 OPPENHEIM'S 
INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 1, § 10, at30; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 102 
cmt.e. 
201. ROE state options for, and possibly limits on, actions a commander may take in anned 
conflict situations. In U.S. practice, commanders are strongly reminded of their duty to defend 
their ship, unit, etc., i.e., to exercise self-defense, including anticipatory self-defense, pursuant to 
U.S. policy. See generally BRADD C. HAyES, NAVAL RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: MANAGEMENT 
TOOLS FORCruSIS (1989); J. Ashley Roach, Rules of Engagement, 36 NAVAL WARC. REV. 46 
Oan.-Feb 1983), reprinted in 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 865 (1988); Ivan A. Shearer, Rules 
of Engagement and the Implementation of the Law of Naval Warfare, id. 767 (1988); supra note 1. 
202. See supra notes 10, 111-27 and accompanying text. MCCORMACK, supra note 1, at 
253-61, has extensive, helpful analysis of the trials; see also ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 
73-76. 
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203. NurembergJudgment, supra note 116, 17 Tr. Maj. War Crim. Before Int'l M. Trib. 458, 
469 (1948) (argument of Prof. Dr. Hermann Jahreiss, counsel for defendant Albert JodI). 
204. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
205. The Tribunal also dismissed arguments, based on Secretary of State Kellogg's 
comments on the self-defense reservation to the Pact of Paris, supra note 11, that Germany alone 
could judge legitimacy of its self-defense claim. Nuremberg Judgment, supra, 1 Tr. Maj. War 
Crim. Before Int'l M. Trib. at 208, 218-22, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. at 205, 207. See MCCORMACK, 
supra note 1, at 254-56; supra notes 111-27 and accompanying text. 
206. BOWETf, supra note 1, at 143; see also MCCORMACK, supra note 1, at 254-56. 
207. Cf. Hague III, supra note 38, arts. 1, 3. Japan had ratified Hague III in 1911, the 
Netherlands in 1909. DIETRICH SCHINDLER &jIRITOMAN, THE LAws OF ARMED CONFLICTS: 
A COLLECIlON OF CONVENTIONS, REsOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 60 (3d ed. 1988). 
208. United States v. Araki, judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(Nov. 4-12, 1948), reprinted in 1 B.V.A. ROLING & C.F. RUTER, THE TOKYO JUDGMENT: THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST (LM.T.F.E.) 29 APRIL 1946-12 
NOVEMBER 1948, at 15, 21,382 (1977); supra notes 17,33-35,183 and accompanying text; see 
also ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 76; MCCORMACK, supra note 1, at 258-59. 
209. G.A. Res. 95(1), supra note 117. 
210. LC.j. STATUTE, art. 38(1) (d); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 103(2). Most 
municipal legal systems recognize a right of anticipatory self-defense. MCCORMACK, supra note 
1, at 271. This adds more weight to a view that the right exists in international law. I.C.J. 
STATUTE, art. 38(1) (c); but see RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, § 103(2). 
211. See supra notes 63, 138-43 and accompanying text. 
212. See supra notes 149-63 and accompanying text. 
213. See supra notes 17,33-35, 138-43, 149-59, 183,208 and accompanying text. 
214. See supra notes 167-85 and accompanying text. 
215. See supra notes 202-84 and accompanying text. 
216. Part IV does not examine practice under the agreements. Others have. See generally, 
e.g., ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 215-90; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 345-48; 
MCCORMACK, supra note 1, at 211-39, and sources cited. These discuss better-known 
situations. JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 1919-1991 at 178-213 (4th ed. 1994) 
demonstrates that smaller incidents since 1945 that may involve bilateral or occasionally 
multilateral responses may supply more content to practice than is now available. Part IV does 
not consider the right, recognized under the Charter and in pre-Charter times, for States to use 
arrangements less formal than a treaty to assert collective self-defense, including anticipatory 
self-defense. See supra notes 17,33-35, 83, 208, 213 and accompanying text. 
217. ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 102; Tucker, supra note 171, at33. 
218. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text. 
219. Compare Rio Treaty, supra note 168, art.3(1), with Act ofChapultepec, supra note 168, 
Pts. 1(3), III. The Treaty applies within North and South America and adjoining oceans. Rio 
Treaty, supra, arts. 3 (3),4. Act ofChapultepec, supra, Pts. 1(3), III, had provisions similar to the 
Treaty, art. 3 (1), but the Act declared that provisions were subject to the projected international 
organization, i.e., the United Nations, and had no specific geographic parameters of application, 
although the whole tenor of the Act pointed toward Western Hemisphere self-defense. Cf. 
Canyes, supra note 168, at 506. See also Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 
1948 (OAS Charter), 2 U.S.T. 2394,119 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Protocol, Feb. 27,1967,21 
U.S.T. 607; Protocol, Dec. 5,1985,21 I.L.M. 533 (1985), replacing Pan American Union, supra 
note 133, in place when Act of Chapultepec, supra, was signed. The 1985 OAS protocol is not in 
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force for all members, including the United States. M.J. BOWMAN & D.J. HARRIS, 
MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS 177 (11th Cum. Supp. 1995). For 
history of inter-American relations in the Pan American Union, OAS and Rio Treaty contexts, 
see generally M. MARGARET BALL, THE OAS IN TRANSITION (1969); GORDON 
CONNELL-SMITH, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM (1966); STOETZER, supra note 17; ANN VAN 
WYNEN THOMAS &A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (1963); 
Charles G. Fenwick, The Inter-American Regional System: Fifty Years of Progress, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 
18 (1956). 
220. See supra notes 167-70, 218 and accompanying text. 
221. Rio Treaty, supra note 168, art. 3(2). at 96-97; ActofChapultepec, supra note 168, had 
no counterpart. 
222. Rio Treaty, supra note 168, art. 3(4). at 97; see also id., art. 5,62 Stat. at 1701, 21 
U.N.T.S. at 97; U.N. CHARTER, art. 51. Rio Treaty, supra, art. 1, pledges that parties will not 
threaten or use force inconsistent with the Charter. Cf. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 2(4), 103; supra 
notes 112, 176 and accompanying text. 
223. Rio Treaty, supra note 168, art. 6. Id., art. 9, defined aggression as including 
a. Unprovoked armed attack by a State against the territory, the people, or the land, 
sea or air forces of another State; [and] 
b. Invasion, by the armed forces of a State, of the territory of an American State, 
through the trespassing of boundaries demarcated in accordance with a treaty, judicial 
decision, or arbitral award, or, [absent] ... frontiers thus demarcated, invasion affecting a 
region ... under the effective jurisdiction of another State. 
Compare Act ofChapultepec, supra note 168, Pts. 1(3)-1(4). 
224. Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, 
Mar. 17, 1948, art. 4, 19 U.N.T.S. 51,57 (WEUTreaty), amended by Protocol Modifying Treaty 
for Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-Defence, 
Oct. 23, 1954,211 id. 342 (WEU Protocol I); Protocol on Forces of Western European Union, 
Oct. 23,1954, id. 358 (WEU Protocol II); Protocol on Control of Armaments, with Annexes, 
Oct. 23, 1954, id. 364; Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union for Control of 
Armaments, Oct. 23, 1954, id. 376; and other protocols in 1990 and 1992, which do not amend 
art. 4. See BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note 219, at 177 (11th Cum. Supp. 1995). 
225. WEU Treaty, supra note 224, art. 7. 
226. Compare id. with WEU Protocol I, supra note 224, art. 4. 
227. Nothing in the Treaty can be interpreted as affecting the Council's authority and 
responsibility under the Charter to take action it deems necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. WEU Treaty, supra note 224, art. 5. 
228. WEU Protocol II, supra note 224. 
229. WEU Protocol I, supra note 224, art. 3. The WEU was moribund for more than thirty 
years, existing in the shadow ofNA TO, but it was revitalized in 1986 to meet issues arising out of 
the Iran-Iraq war in the Persian Gulf. Europe's Multilateral Organizations, 3 DEPT ST. DISPATCH 
351,354 (1992). The European Union has recognized WEU's security role. See generally Walker, 
Integration and Disintegration, supra note 42, at 15-17. 
230. See generally ALFRED CAHEN, THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO 1016 
(1989); THE CHANGING FUNCTIONS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (\VEU) xiii-xxx 
(ArieBloed & RamsesA. Wesseleds., 1994); STANLEYR. SLOAN, NATO's FUTURE: TOWARD 
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A NEW TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN 173-75 (1985). Treaty of Dunkirk, supra note 63, had been 
a WEU predecessor; other European States' desire to accede was a catalyst for WEU. COOK, 
supra note 63, at 116, 122, 259-60. Ironically, a European Defense Community had been 
contemplated as part of the then European Economic Community; it would have been 
"exclusively defensive," but would have allowed response to any "armed aggression" against a 
member State or European Defense Forces constituted under the Treaty. The Treaty pledged 
cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Treaty Constituting the European 
Defence Community, May 27,1952, arts. 2, 5, reprinted in NAVAL WAR c., INTERNATIONAL 
LAW DOCUMENTS 1952-53, at 147, 148-49 (1954); Karl Lowenstein, Sovereignty and 
International Co-Operation, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 222, 237-38 (1954). The Treaty failed of 
ratification. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Statement to U.S. Senate Armed 
Services Committee, 32 DEPT ST. BULL. 605, 606 (1955). The United States had not opposed 
the Treaty. Message of the President of the United States Stating United States Position on 
Relation between the European Defense Community and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, Apr. 16, 1954, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1954, reprinted in NAVAL WAR C., supra at 
232. 
231. WEU Statement on Recent Events in the Gulf, Apr. 19, 1988, in CHANGING, supra 
note 210, at 81; CAHEN, supra note 230, at 47-50. 
232. Article 6 defined the territory of the parties covered by Article 5. North Atlantic 
Treaty, supra note 82, arts. 5-6, modified as to territory covered by Protocol on Accession of 
Greece and Turkey, supra note 82; Protocol on Accession of Federal Republic of Germany, supra 
note 82; Protocol on Accession of Spain, supra note 82. These protocols do not affect the 
substance of other terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, supra. Currently NATO is in the process 
of admitting new members in Eastern Europe. See supra note 82. 
233. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 82, art. 7; see also U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(4), 103; 
supra notes 112, 176 and accompanying text. 
234. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 82, art. 4; see also HARLAN CLEVELAND, NATO: 
THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN 13-33 (1970) ("golden rule of consultation"). For NATO 
origins and development, see COOK, supra note 63; ALFRED GROSSER, THE WESTERN 
ALLIANCE: EUROPEAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE 1945 (Michael Shaw trans. 1980); 
ROBERT ENDICOIT OSGOOD, NATO: THE ENTANGLING ALLIANCE (1962); SLOAN, supra 
note 230; John Duffield, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Alliance Theory, in NGAIRE 
WOODS, EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945, ch. 15 (Ngaire Woods ed., 
1996); Goodhart, supra note 173. 
235. Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation between Arab States, with 
Military Annex, June 17, 1950, art. 2, 157 Brit. & For. St. Pap. 669-70,49 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 
51 (1955) (Arab League Joint Defense Treaty). See also Pact of League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 
1945, 70 U.N.T.S. 238; HUSSEIN A. HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND 
REGIONAL DISPUTES, ch. 1 (1975); MAJID KHADDURI, THE GULF WAR: THE ORIGINS AND 
IMpLICATIONS OF THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLIer 140 (1988); ROBERT W. MACDONALD, THE 
LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES (1965); Khadduri, The Arab League As a Regional Arrangement, 40 
AM.J. INT'L L. 756 (1946). 
236. U.N. CHARTER art. 103; see also supra notes 112, 176 and accompanying text. 
237. Arab League Joint Defense Treaty, supra note 235, art. 3, 157 Brit. & For. St. Pap. at 
670,49 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. at 52. 
238. Id., Military Annex, art. 1 (a), 157 Brit. & For. St. Pap. at 672,49 AM. J.lNT'L L. SUPP. 
at 53. 
239. STARk'E, supra note 183, at 77. 
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240. ANzus Pact, supra note 183, art. 3, suspended for New Zealand Sept. I, 1986. 
MCINTYRE, supra note 183, at 403-05; TIF, supra note 113, at350. For analysis of New Zealand's 
refusal to admit ships with nuclear capability and ANzus future prospects, see generally JACOB 
BERCOVITCH, ANzus IN CRISIS (1988); FRANK P. DONNI, ANzus IN REVISION (1991); 
MICHAEL C. PUGH, THE ANzus CRISIS, NUCLEAR VISITING AND DETERRENCE (1989); 
THOMAS-DURRELL YOUNG, AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND UNITED STATES SECURlIT 
RELATIONS,1951-1986 (1992); W. KeithJackson&James W. Lamare, TheANzvs Conflict and 
New Zealand Politics, in INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND DOMESTIC POLmCS 53 (Lamare ed., 
1991); Jock Phillips, New Zealand and the ANzvs Alliance: Changing National Self-Perceptions, in 
AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES: INTERNAL CHANGE AND ALLIANCE 
RELATIONS IN THE ANzus STATES 183 (Richard W. Baker ed., 1991); James N. Rosenau, 
Peripheral International Relationships in a More Benign World: Reflections on American Orientations 
TowardANZVS, inid. 203. 
241. ANzus Pact, supra note 183, art. 4. Like the Rio Treaty and the NATO Agreement, the 
ANzus Pact, supra, art. 5,limits its territorial scope to attacks on parties' metropolitan territories, 
island territories under their jurisdiction, or their armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the 
Pacific. 
242. Compare ANzus Pact, supra note 183, art. 4, with North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 82, 
art. 5. Similar to the Rio and North Atlantic Treaties, supra notes 82, 168. ANzus Pact, supra, 
art. 5, limits its territorial scope to attacks on parties' metropolitan territories, island territories 
under their jurisdiction, and parties' armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific. See also 
MCINTIRE, supra note 183, chs. 11-15; REESE, supra note 183, ch. 8; STARKE, supra note 183, 
chs. 1-2; Leicester C. Webb, Australia and SEATO, in SEATO: SIX STUDIES 47,50-57 (George 
Modelski ed., 1964). As of 1965, there had been no NATO-ANzus liaison. STARKE, supra at 
226-28. 
243. STARKE, supra note 183, at 121. 
244. It did not include application to parties' armed forces or public vessels or aircraft. 
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, with Protocol, Sept. 8, 1954, arts. 4, 8, 6 U.S.T. 81, 
83-84, 209 U.N.T.S. 28, 30, 32 (SEATO Treaty); see also LESZEK BUSlYNSKI, SEATO: THE 
FAILURE OF AN AllIANCE STRATEGY chs. 1-2 (1983); STARKE, supra note 183, at 221-26; 
George Modelski, SEATO: Its Function and Organization, in SEATO, supra note 242, at 8·45. 
245. Pacific Charter, Sept. 8, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 91, 209 U.N.T.S. 23, 24. 
246. BOWMAN & HARRIs, supra note 219, at 196; BUSlYNSKI, supra note 244, ch. 6. 
247. TIF, supra note 113, at 350. 
248. Treaty of Alliance, Political Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, Aug. 9, 1954, 211 
U.N.T.S. 237 (Second Balkan Pact), partial successor to the Little Entente, supra note 129; a 
cooperation and friendship treaty among Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia had been signed a year 
later. By 1956 the arrangement was in ruins; by 1962 it was a dead letter. See generally JOHN O. 
IATRIDES, BALKAN TRIANGLE (1968); see also J.A.S. GRENVILLE & BERNARD WASSERSTEIN, 
THE MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREATIES SINCE 1945, at 390-91 (1987) (2 GRENVILLE); 
Gerhard Bebr, Regional Organizations: A United Nations Problem, 49 AM. J. INT'l L. 166, 182 
(1955). 
249. Obligations under the Pact were subject to those owed other alliances, e.g., the North 
Atlantic Treaty, supra note 82, for Greece or Turkey; the Pact required consultation among 
members for conflicts in these obligations. Compare Second Balkan Pact, supra note 248, arts. 2, 
6-7, 10, with Pact of Organisation of Little Entente, supra note 129, arts. 10-11; Protocol, supra 
note 130, arts. 1,3. Whether consultation was a prerequisite before action is debatable; a foreign 
minister for a party State said that consultation would not be an obstacle, since all joint plans had 
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been prepared and would be applied when joint measures were decided. IATRIDES, supra note 
248, at 139. 
250. Pact of Mutual Co-operation, Feb. 24, 1955, art. 1, 233 U.N.T.S. 199, 212 (Baghdad 
Pact). See also Declaration Respecting Baghdad Pact, July 28, 1958, 11 1, 9 U.S.T. 1077,335 
U.N.T.S. 205, 206, declaring parties' "determination to maintain their collective security and to 
resist aggression, direct or indirect." See ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE 
BAGHDAD PACT: ORIGINS AND POLmCAL SETTING (Feb. 1956); Brian Holden Reid, The 
"Northern Tier" and the Baghdad Pact, in THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CHURCHILL'S PEACETIME 
ADMINISTRATION 1951-55, at 159-74 Oohn W. Young ed., 1988); Margaret Muryani 
Manchester, The Tangled Web: The Baghdad Pact, Eisenhower, and Arab Nationalism chs. 1-3 
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Clark Univ.) (in Naval War College Library) for the 
Pact's origins and history. 
251. There was no territorial limitation, although the treaty's being limited to Arab League 
members in effect excluded all but the Middle East and northern Africa. Baghdad Pact, supra 
note 250, arts. 2, 5. 
252. The United States was a "de facto" member but not a Pact party. See Declaration 
Respecting the Baghdad Pact, supra note 250; BOWMAN & HARRIS, supra note 219, at 196; Reid, 
supra note 250, at 159-80; Manchester, supra note 250, at 336-45. 
253. Cf. Protocol, Mar. 31,1991, Bo\XlMAN & HARRIS, supra note 219, at 196 (11th Cum. 
Supp. 1995). 
254. Compare Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, May 14, 1955, 
art. 4, 219 U.N.T.S. 24, 28 (\Varsaw Pact), with North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 82, arts. 5,7. 
For analysis of origins and practice under the Pact, see generally NEIL FODOR, THE WARSAW 
TREATY ORGANIZATION: A POLITICAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (1990); J.P. JAIN, 
DOCUMENTARY STUDY OF THE WARSAW PACT 1-39 (1973). Mark Kramer, The Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe: Spheres of Influence, in WOODS, supra note 234, ch. 5, is an overview of the 
Soviet system, including the Pact. 
255. Compare \Varsaw Pact, supra note 254, with North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 82, art. 
4. 
256. Mutual Defense Treaty, Phil.-U.S., Aug. 30, 1951, art. 4, 3 U.S.T. 3947, 3950, 177 
U.N.T.S. 133, 136 (Philippines Defense Treaty). 
257. Id., art. 5. 
258. Id., art. 3. 
259. Compare Mutual Defense Treaty, Repub. of Korea-U.S., with understanding, Oct. 1, 
1953, arts. 2-3, 5 U.S.T. 2368, 2372-73, 238 U.N.T.S. 199, 203-04, with Philippines Defense 
Treaty, supra note 256, arts. 3-5. 
260. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, with Agreed Minute and Exchange of 
Notes, Japan-U.S., Jan. 19, 1960 Oapan Defense Treaty), arts. 4-5, 11 id. 1632, 1634, 373 
U.N.T.S. 179, 188, with Philippines Defense Treaty, supra note 256, arts. 3-5, 11 id. 3950, 177 
U.N.T.S. at 136. Japan Defense Treaty, supra, replaced Security Treaty, Japan-U.S., Sept. 8, 
1951,3 U.S.T. 3329,136 U.N.T.S. 211. Japan has moved to a policy of offshore land, sea and air 
defense from its earlier strategy of defense at the water's edge. See generally Japan-United States, 
Joint Statement on Review of Defense Cooperation Guidelines and Defense Cooperation Guidelines, 
Sept. 23, 1997, reprinted in 361.L.M. 1621 (1997); PETERJ. KATZENSTEIN, CULTURAL NORMS 
AND NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICE AND MILITARY IN POSTWAR JAPAN 132-39 (1996); Mike 
M. Mochizuki, A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance, in MIKE M. MOCHIZUKI, TOWARD A TRUE 
ALLIANCE: RESTRUCTURING U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS, ch. 1 (1997). This shift seems 
to mark a change to a more anticipatory self-defense mode. Mutual Defense Treaty, Repub. of 
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China-U.S., Dec. 2, 1954, with U.S. Reservations, arts. 4-5, 6 U.S.T. 433, 436 248 U.N.T.S. 213, 
215 included the same kind of terms as the J apan Treaty; the United States denounced it when it 
recognized the People's Republic of China. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 
(1979). See also 2 GRENVILLE, supra note 248, at 109-113, noting U.S. Senate reservations to the 
China treaty forbade U.S. action unless China were forced to fight in self-defense or territorial 
extension of the U.S. commitment without Senate approval. If the United States negotiated 
formal agreements with Persian Gulf states other than Kuwait after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 
1990, these bilateral treaties may provide for anticipatory collective self-defense. The 
Kuwait-U.S. agreement was a reactive defense treaty, since it had been invaded by the time the 
United States negotiated with Kuwait. These treaties have not been and may never be published 
for national security reasons. See George K. Walker, The Crisis Over Kuwait, August 1990 -
February 1991, 1991 Duke J. Compo & Int'l L. 25, 29-30; REsTATEMENT (Third), supra note 52, 
§ 312 r.n.5; see also supra note 52. 
261. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, Mar. 18, 1948, Bulg.-USSR, art. 
2,48 D.N.T.S. 135, 144 (If either party is "involved in hostilities with a Germany which might 
seek to renew its policy of aggression or with any other State ... associated with Germany in a 
policy of aggression either directly or indirectly or in any other way, the other ... shall 
immediately extend to the ... Party involved in hostilities military and other assistance with all 
the means at its disposal[,]" subject to the Charter); Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance 
and Cooperation,June 12, 1964, Ger. Dem. Rep.-USSR, art. 5, 31.L.M. 754, 756 (1965); (treaty 
subject to Warsaw Pact, supra note 254); see also FODOR, supra note 254, at 5-6, 188-91; 2 
GRENVILLE, supra note 248, at 185; JAIN, supra note 254, at 13-14; Bowett, Collective 
Self-Defence, supra note 173, at 144; W.W. Kulski, The Soviet System of Collective Security 
Compared with the Western System, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 453 (1950). Treaty of Friendship, Alliance 
and Mutual Assistance, Feb. 14, 1950, People's Rep. China-USSR, art. 1, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, 12-14, 
had language like the Bulgaria treaty, but said Japan was the potential adversary. See also 2 
GRENVILLE, supra at 158-59. USSR satellites also negotiated agreements among themselves, 
subject to the Warsaw Pact, supra, e.g., Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance, Apr. 5, 1967, arts. 4-5, Ger. Dem. Rep.-Pol., 61.L.M. 514 (1968). 
262. Treaty of Dunkirk, supra note 63, preamble, arts. 1-2, 9 U.N.T.S. at 188-92, 
predecessor to the \VEU Treaty, supra note 224; see also COOK, supra note 63, at 33,75, 114, 
116,122,259-60; GROSSER, supra note 234, at 84-85; supra notes 224-31 and accompanying 
text. Countries of the Western alliance systems concluded agreements too; some seem to 
contemplate only reactive self-defense obligations, e.g., Alliance Treaty, July 29, 1953, 
Libya-U.K., arts. 2-3, 186 U.N.T.S. 185, 192 (consultation required for an "imminent menace of 
hostilities"; also describing basing rights). Nonaligned States negotiated bilateral agreements, 
e.g., Defense Agreement, May 30,1967, United Arab Rep.-Jordan, art. 1, 61.L.M. 516 (1968) 
(collective defense against "armed aggression"). See also 2 Grenville, supra note 248, at 348, 361. 
263. See generally Walker, Maritime Neutrality, supra note 146, at 131-40. 
264. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
265. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
266. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
267. MCCORMACK, supra note 1, at 131; Mullerson & Scheffer, supra note 1, at 110-11. 2 
O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 1101, and O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 3, recognized this; writing 
over two decades earlier, O'Connell had concluded, however, that navies were coming to a 
reactive view of self-defense. Id. at 83, 171. Perhaps O'Connell's view would be different today; 
he seems to say as much in 2 O'CONNELL, supra at 1101. See also supra note 4 and accompanying 
text. 
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268. See supra notes 201-03, 205-06, 214, 217, 220, 224, 233, 236-38, 248-49 and 
accompanying text. The principal exception appears to be the now defunct Baghdad Pact, supra 
note 250; see also supra notes 250-52. 
269. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 1, § 52aa, at 157. 
270. See supra notes 109-15, 172-73,202-10 and accompanying text. To be sure, most 
States are UN Members today. However, a customary collective self-defense right may be 
claimed if the Charter does not apply. See generally Nicaragua Case, supra note 1; supra notes 112, 
174-76. 
271. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(1); see also GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 5, at 25-26, citing 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.]. 151, 213-15 (sep. opin. of Fitzmaurice, ].); 
LOUIS B. SOHN, BROADENING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN PREVENTING, 
MITIGATING OR ENDING INTERNATIONAL OR INTERNAL CONFLICfS THAT THREATEN 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURIIT 5-6 (INT'L R. OF L. CENTER OCCASIONAL PAPERS, 2d 
Ser., No.1, 1997) (Charter drafters felt that the United Nations' "first purpose" was maintaining 
international peace and security). Reference in Art. 1(1) to maintenance ofinternational peace 
and security through collective measures has meant collective security through the UN system. 
GOODRICH ET AL., supra, at 51-52; SIMMA, supra note 1, at 51-52. A right of collective 
self-defense is not inconsistent with or subordinate to Art. 1(1)'s declaration that States should 
seek dispute resolution through collective measures within the UN system, e.g., through Security 
Council action. U.N. CHARTER art. 51, preserves an "inherent right of ... collective 
self-defence" until the Council acts. This is buttressed by the continuing vitality of the principle 
of national sovereignty, also stated in the Charter. See generally id., art. 2(1); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. 
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.]. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4, 18; U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. Doc. N471277, S124111 
(1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 956, 959 (1992); MICHAEL AKEKURST, A MODERN 
INTRODUCfION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-23 (Brian Chapman ed., 3d ed. 1977); BRIERLY, 
supra note 173, at 45-49; SCHACHTER, supra note 1, at 9-15; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 
Empowering the United Nations, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1992, at 89,98-99; Charney, supra note 
195, at 530; but see HENKIN, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
272. SCHACHTER, supra note 1, at 401. 
273. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
274. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text. 
275. See, e.g., supra notes 203, 215, 220, 223-24, 239 and accompanying text. 
276. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(1),51, 103. See also s~pra notes 112, 176 and accompanying 
text. 
277. See supra notes 1-4, 21, 23-30,32,78-80,85,97-101,10,127-32,143-64,202-10 and 
accompanying text. 
278. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
279. E.g., ALEXANDROV, supra note 1, at 163, appears to support his view that the 1981 
Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor could not be supported by self-defense because of the 
1994 debate on imposing sanctions on North Korea, rather than using force, because of the 
danger of nuclear weapons. MCCORMACK, supra note 1, at 98-99, derides the claim that Israel 
had been given a necessary guarantee of security under the U.S. "Star Wars" program was a 
reason why it may not have been necessary for Israel to bomb the reactor. 
280. See VON CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 111, at 117-21. 
281. REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 52, § 313 cmt. b analyzes declarations and 
understandings: 
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When signing or adhering to an international agreement, a state may make a 
unilateral declaration that does not purport to be a reservation. Whatever it is called, it 
constitutes a reservation in fact if it purports to exclude, limit, or modify the state's legal 
obligation. Sometimes, however, a declaration purports to be an "understanding," an 
interpretation of the agreement in a particular respect. Such an interpretive declaration is 
not a reservation if it reflects the accepted view of the agreement. But another ... party 
may challenge the expressed understanding, treating it as a reservation which it is not 
prepared to accept . 
. . . [For] a multilateral agreement, a declaration of understanding may have complex 
consequences. Ifit is acceptable to all ... , they need only acquiesce. If, however, some •.. 
share or accept the understanding but others do not, there may be a dispute as to what the 
agreement means, and whether the declaration is in effect a reservation. In the absence of 
an authoritative means for resolving that dispute, the declaration, even if treated as a 
reservation, might create an agreement at least between the declaring state and those who 
agree with that understanding. See [REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra, § 313 (2) (c), dealing 
with reservations] .... However, some ... parties may treat it as a reservation and object 
to it as such, and there will remain a dispute between the two groups as to what the 
agreement means. 
See also ILC Rep., supra note 188, at 189-90; Bowett, Reservations, supra note 124, at 69; supra 
notes 124, 197 and accompanying text for analysis on reservations. 
282. Protocol Additional to Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S.3 (Protocol I). Although the United States is likely to ratify Protocol Additional to 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, id. 609, the Reagan 
administration expressed serious reservations concerning Protocol I, supra, and did not seek 
Senate advice and consent for it. Letter of Transmittal from President Reagan to the U.S. 
Senate, Jan. 29, 1987; Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State George P. Schultz to President 
Reagan, Dec. 13, 1986, in Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the 
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts, Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 100--2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 26 LL.M. 561 (1987). 
283. Convention (I) for Amelioration of Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114,75 U.NT.S. 31; Convention (II) for Amelioration of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, id. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, id. 
3316,75 U.N.T.S.135; Convention (IV) Relative to Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, id. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Fourth Convention). 
284. Protocol I, supra note 282, art. 51. Article 51(2} and 51(5) prohibitions on attacks on 
civilians, absent other considerations, e.g., civilians who take up arms, restate customary law. 
MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICf 299 & n.3 (1982); 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE CONDUCf OF ARMED 
CONFLlCf AND AIR OPERATIONS AFP 110--31, ch.14 (1976); SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 
5, 1139; NWP 1-14, supra note 1, § 6.2.3.2. (noting protections also under Fourth Convention, 
supra note 238, art. 33, 6 U.S.T. at 3538, 75 U.N.T.S. at310), 11.2 n.3, 11.3; NWP 9A, supra 
note 1, 1111 6.2.3.2 (noting protections also under Fourth Convention, supra note 283, art. 33, 
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11.2 n.3, 11.3; 4 JEAN S. PICfET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 224-29 
(1952); STONE, LEGALCONlROLS, supra note 182, at 684-732; MichaelJ. Matheson, Remarks, 
in Session One: The United States' Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 
1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions, in Symposium, The Sixth Annual American 
Red Cross· Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop 
on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
2 AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y 419, 423, 426 (1987); William G. Schmidt, The Protection of Victims 
of International Armed Conflicts: Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 24 AIR FORCE L. 
REv. 189, 225-32 (1984); Waldemar A. Solf, Protection of Civilians Against the Effects ofHosti!ities 
Under Customary International Law and Under Protocol I, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117, 
130-31. Civilians may not be used as human shields, nor may they be a subject of attacks 
intended to terrorize them, although otherwise legitimate attacks that happen to terrorize them 
are permissible. Specific intent to terrorize gives rise to liability. NWP 9A, supra, ~ 11.2 (noting 
protections under Fourth Convention, supra, arts. 28, 33, 11.3; Hans·Peter Gasser, Prohibition of 
Terrorist Attacks in International Humanitarian Law, 1985 INT'L REv. RED CRoss 200; 
Commission of Jurists to Consider and Report Upon Revision of Rules of Air Warfare, Hague 
Rules for Aerial Warfare, art. 22, reprinted in Ronzitti, supra note 138, at 385; Matheson, supra at 
426; Schmidt, supra at 227. Rules of distinction, necessity and proportionality, with concomitant 
risk of collateral damage inherent in any attack that are stated in Article 51 generally restate 
custom. BOTHE ET AL, supra at 309-11,359-67; FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE 
WAGING OF WAR 99-100 (1987); MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 525; NWP 9A, 
supra, ~11 5.2 & n.6, 8.1.2.1; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra, ~11 39-42 & Commentaries; STONE, 
supra at 352-53; W.J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 
98 MIL L. REv. 91, 125 (1982) (questioning whether proportionality is an accepted customary 
norm); Matheson, supra at 426; Results of the First Meeting of the Madrid Plan of Action Held in 
Bochum, F.R.G., November 1989, 7 BOCHUMER SCHRIFTEN ZUR FRIEDENSSICHERUNG UND 
ZUM HUMANITAREN VOLKERRECHT 170-71 (1991); Schmidt, supra at 233-38; Solf, supra at 
131; G.J.F. van Hegelsom, Methods and Means of Combat in Naval Warfare, in 8 BOCHUMER 
SCHRIFTEN ZUR FRIEDENSSICHERUNG UND ZUM HUMANITAREN VOLKERRECHT I, 18-19 
(1992). 
285. Protocol I, supra note 282, art. 52. Article 52 states a general customary norm, except 
for its prohibition on reprisals against civilians in art. 52(1), for which there is a division of view. 
See generally BOTHEET AL, supra note 284, at 320-27; COLOMBOS, supra note 138, §§ 510-11, 
524-25, 528-29; NWP 1-14, supra note I, § 6.2.3. & n.36, 6.2.3.2 (protections for some 
civilians from reprisals under the Fourth Convention, supra note 283, art. 33, 6 U.S.T. at 3538, 
75 U.N.T.S. at308·10), 8.1.1 & n.9 8.1.2 &n.12 (U.S. position that ProtocolI, supra art. 52(1), 
1125 U.N.T.S. at 27, "creates new law"); NWP 9A, supra note 1, ~11 6.2.3 & n. 33, 6.2.3.2 
(noting protections for some civilians from reprisals under Fourth Convention, supra note 283, 
art. 33, 8.1.1 &n.9, 8.1.2 &n.12 (noting US position that ProtocolI, supra, art. 52[1], "creates 
new law"); 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 1105.06; 4 PICfET, supra note 284, at 131; CLAUD 
PILLOUD, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDmONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ~~ 1994-2038 (Yves Sandoz et a1. eds., 1987); Matheson, 
supra note 284, at 426; Solf, supra note 284, at 131. Frank Russo,Jr., Targeting Theory in the Law 
of Naval Warfare, 30 NAVAL L. REv. I, 17 n. 36 (1992) rejects applying Protocol I, supra, art. 
52(2), to naval warfare. 
286. Protocol I, supra note 282, art. 57. Rules of distinction, necessity and proportionality, 
with the concomitant risk of collateral damage inherent in any attack, in Article 57, are 
generally restatements of customary norms. See generally BOTHE ET AL, supra note 284, at 
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309-11; KALSHOVEN, supra note 284, at 99-100; MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 
525; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 5, 1111 39-42 & Commentaries; STONE, LEGAL 
CONTROLS, supra note 168, at 352-53; Fenrick, The Rule, supra note 284, at 125 (questioning 
whether proportionality is accepted as a customary norm); Matheson, supra note 284, at 426; 
Results, supra note 262, at 170-71; Schmidt, supra note 284, at 233-38; Solf, supra note 284, at 
131; van Hegelsom, supra note 284, at 18-19. 
287. Declaration of Belgium, May 20,1986, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 
207, at 706, 707; Declaration of Italy, Feb. 27, 1986, reprinted in id. 712; Declaration of the 
Netherlands, June 26, 1977, reprinted in id. 713, 714; Declaration of the United Kingdom, Dec. 
12, 1977, reprinted in id. 717. 
288. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May Be Deemed Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 
1342 U.N.T.S. 137 19 I.L.M. 1523 (Conventional Weapons Convention). 
289. Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 288, Protocol on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II), Oct. 10, 1980, art. 
2(4), 1342 U.N.T.X. 168, as amended, May 3, 1996, art. 2(6), 35 I.L.M. 1206, 1209 (1996) 
(Amended Protocol II) ; Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Incendiary Weapons 
(Protocol III), Oct. 10, 1980, art. 1(3), 1342 U.N.T.S. 171, In. The United States has ratified 
the Convention and Protocols I and II supra; Protocol III is not in force for the United Sates. TIF, 
supra note 113, at 454. However, Amended Protocol II, Protocol III and Protocol IV on Blinding 
Laser Weapons, May 3, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1218 (1996) are now before the U.S. Senate. Marian 
Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 91 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 325 (1997). Protocol IV and Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I), Oct. 
10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168, do not have these provisions. Protocol II and III commentators say 
little about these provisions; they state the obvious. See Burrus M. Carnahan, The Law of Land 
Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 105 MIL 
L. REv. 73 (1984); W.J. Fenrick, Comment, New Developments in the Law Concerning the Use of 
Conventional Weapons in Armed Conflict, 19 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 229 (1981); Howard S. Levie, 
Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Conventional Weapons, 68 ST. JOHN'S REV. 643 (1994); 
J. Ashley Roach, Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Anns Control or Humanitarian Law? 
105 MIL L. REv. 1 (1984); William G. Schmidt, The Conventional Weapons Convention: 
Implications for the American Soldier, 24 A.F.L. REv. 279 (1984). The United States declared it 
would not sign Convention on Prohibition of Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997,36 I.L.M. 1507 (1997). See 
generally President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Landmines and an Exchange with Reporters, 33 
WEEKLY COMPo PRES. DOC. 1356--59 (Sept. 22,1997). Action by other states indicates that the 
Convention will be in force soon. 
290. Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to Which the United States Is Not a Party, 35 I.L.M. 1339 
(1996) lists 145 States party to Protocol I, supra note 282. The United States is not a party; see 
supra note 282. TIF, supra note 113, at 454, listed 63 States for Conventional Weapons 
Convention, supra note 288. Most are parties to Protocols II and III, supra note 289. 
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